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ESSAY
AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF FREE TRADE IN
MEDIA PRODUCTS
C. EDWIN BAKER*
The issue of free trade in media or "cultural" products has been
one of the most contentious aspects of recent trade negotiations.
Framed as a dispute between culture and economics-or giving
audiences around the world the media they want-the American
pro-free-trade position has recognized, but downplayed, the
cultural claims and has asserted that economic principle clearly
shows the merits of free trade. In this Essay, Professor Baker's
primary aim is to show that the American economic argument is
wrong. In making this critique, Professor Baker has two tasks.
He first must show that free trade in the media context
systematically fails to best satisfy people's preferences. The Essay
does this by examining the nature of monopolistic competition in
mass media goods, the effects of positive and negative externalities,
and the propriety of reliance on the market's "willingness and
ability to pay" standard as a method to identify or measure
consumer preferences about media products. Professor Baker
accomplishes the second necessary task of the critique by showing
that nation-neutral laws will not be adequate to correct the
problems of the market; that is, the Essay argues that international
trade exacerbates all the problems that exist with the market such
that special treatment of foreign media products is justified.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has pressed hard to apply free trade principles
to cultural products.' Its unrelenting pressure to establish this
position almost derailed the final agreement-seven years in the
making and signed on April 15, 1994-in the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.2
Despite extraordinary efforts, the United States lost on this issue, just
as it had a few years earlier in the 1992 North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations? Similarly, in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, a dispute between the United States and Third World
nations over problems with free market dominance of the world
communications order was a central cause of the United States
leaving the United Nations Educational Social and Cultural
1. Unless context indicates otherwise, I will use "cultural products" and "media
products" interchangeably to refer to types of products that would receive First
Amendment protection in the United States, for example: film, television, music and
other audio recordings, video recordings, text materials, live performances, and, somewhat
more controversially, advertising.
2. See W. Ming Shao, Is There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and
Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 105, 107 & n.9 (1995). Although President
Clinton apparently asserted that trade in film and other audio-visual products was "'a
defining issue' "that would " 'make or break' "the negotiations, the United States lost the
dispute in an eleventh-hour accord. Bernard Weinraub, Clinton Spared Blame by
Hollywood Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at Dl (quoting Hollywood executives).
Newspapers reported that "France defeated the film moguls of Hollywood," Steve
Doughty, Gentlemen, We Have a Deal, DAILY MAIL (London), Dec. 15, 1993, at 10, and
French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur could tell Parliament that "'[t]he European
cultural identity has been saved,'" Scott Kraft, In French Parliament, A Resounding "Oui"
for Accord, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,1993, at A19 (quoting Edouard Balladur).
3. NAFrA followed the earlier Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan.
2, 1988, Can.-U.S., art. 2005, 27 I.L.M. 281, 396, in not covering trade in cultural products.
See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 701, 702, art.
2106, annex 2106.
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Organization (UNESCO).' Both Canada and Europe resolutely
reject free trade rules for cultural products, and the United States
stands almost alone in its view. But the American position is correct
in the opinion of American trade advocates and most American legal
scholars. I, however, will dissent from their view.
The practical importance of this issue is immense. People in
many countries consider the ability to protect their cultural industries
to be vital to their cultural and democratic development, and possibly
even to their survival as nationa5 Moreover, huge monetary stakes
are implicated, as cultural products are the United States's second
largest export item. On a more theoretical level, the issue raises
central questions of journalistic freedom, democratic discourse,
foreign policy, and the international equivalent of multiculturalism.
Not surprisingly, then, although some rounds of the dispute have
been settled, the struggle over media products' trade status
continues
4. The United States withdrew from UNESCO on January 1, 1985, citing
UNESCO's communication initiatives as one of its main reasons. See Colleen Roach,
American Textbooks vs. NWICO History, in THE GLOBAL MEDIA DEBATE: ITS RISE,
FALL, AND RENEWAL 35, 43-46 (George Gerbner et al. eds., 1993); infra notes 182-94
and accompanying text.
5. This view is not new. In the 1920s, a Canadian editorial by Frederick Paul argued
that " ' "if we depend on the[] United States ... for our reading matter we might as well
move our government to Washington .... The press is a stronger cohesive agent than
[P]arliament."' " Ted Magder, Franchising the Candy Store: Split-Run Magazines and a
New International Regime for Trade in Culture, CAN.-AM. PUB. POL'Y, Apr. 1998, at 1, 8
(quoting MARY VIPOND, THE MASS MEDIA IN CANADA 26,27 (1989) (quoting Frederick
Paul, Editorial, National Periodicals or Annexation, SATURDAY NIGHT (Toronto), Mar.
20,1926, at 2)) (alterations in original).
6. See Thomas M. Murray, The U.S.-French Dispute over GATT Treatment of
Audiovisual Products and the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market
Solution Was "Rent-Seeking," 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 203,207 (1997) (reporting that
cultural products are second after aerospace and aviation and noting that the American
entertainment industry produced $18 billion of foreign revenues and generated a $4 billion
trade surplus in 1992 (citing Kirsten L. Kessler, Note, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual
Entertainment: A Proposal for Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers to the
U.S. Entertainment Industry's Exports, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 563, 563-64 (1995))).
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics list the
United States net surplus in 1993 for international film rentals to be $1.742 billion. See
ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., SERVICES: STATISTICS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: 1970-1993, at 108 tbl. A.21 (1996) [hereinafter
OECD]. Trade is vitally important to some of these American media industries, with
foreign markets providing about half of the revenue for U.S. film and television products.
See STEVEN S. WILDMAN & STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN FILMS AND
TELEVISION PROGRAMS 1 (1988).
7. An important recent round resulted in decisions by a World Trade Organization
(WTO) panel and an appellate board holding that Canadian laws protecting its magazine
industry violate older provisions of GATT. The United States brought the legal challenge
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Given the passions and the stakes, the outcomes may primarily
reflect power politics, probably dominated by corporate interests.
Nevertheless, the dominant view in this country is that the United
States wins all the theoretical arguments, especially the rational
economic arguments. Free trade is justified as a matter of principle,
not simply American economic self-interest.
I will argue the contrary. Admittedly, empirical issues cause my
economic analysis to be inconclusive. Nevertheless, I argue that
economic theory suggests that neither consumer welfare nor
economic efficiency support the prevailing American position. In a
prior article, I described three ways in which the special nature of
media products causes markets systematically to fail to give audiences
what they want.8 These arguments, applied below, involve (1) the
nature of monopolistic competition in goods with substantial public
good aspects; (2) the impact of externalities on proper pricing; and (3)
the market's means of measuring preferences. In economic terms,
media markets predictably fail to provide efficient or welfare-
maximizing outcomes. This Essay argues that each of these three
failures applies in the context of international trade in cultural
products.
The broad outlines of the competing arguments in the trade
debate can be stated succinctly. Widely accepted premises justify the
claim that free trade benefits people of all countries, especially
consumers, more productive workers, and more efficient firms. While
free trade disadvantages comparatively inefficient industries within a
nation, free trade advocates argue that a country is better off in the
long term because it is forced to improve the lagging sector's
efficiency or, more often, to move resources now used in
comparatively inefficient sectors to economic activities in which it
holds a comparative advantage. This motivating premise underlies
GATT and most of the world's attempts to expand free trade.9 The
after Canada had carefully assured that its policy would not be covered by NAFTA. See
World Trade Organization Report of the Appellate Body, Canada-Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, June 30, 1997 (last modified Apr. 14, 2000)
<http://www.wto.orglwtolddfleplpublic.html> [hereinafter WTO Report]; infra notes 170-
81 and accompanying text.
8. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,
316-22 (1997).
9. An additional notable consideration supporting free trade is the long-standing
belief that an economically interdependent world will increasingly find warfare to be a
disruptive and hence unappealing form of action. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Perpetual
Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in KANT'S POLITICAL WRMNGS 93, 114 (Hans
Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991).
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United States contends that this conclusion applies aptly to cultural
products, particularly to films and television programming, and also
to magazines, books, newspapers, and advertising. Americans
contend that there is nothing economically singular about these
products that justifies repudiating settled free trade premises,
especially considering that deviations from free trade disadvantage
consumers in the country that is imposing the restrictions. Free trade
gives these consumers the media or cultural products that they want
and leads to more efficient use of material and creative resources. If
there is anything special about media products, advocates contend, it
lies in the products' expressive or informational role. By invoking
international norms concerning freedom of the press and access to
information, 0 free trade advocates argue that the unique nature of
these products provides an independent "human rights" reason to
disapprove of trade restrictions for media products."
An alternative view posits that culture is special and that
countries should have the rights to protect and to promote their own
cultures internally. American commentators label this view as
"protectionist." These commentators accept that cultural trade policy
comes down to a difficult choice between the free trade premise of
letting people have the products that they want (or, equivalently,
advancing economic efficiency) and the admittedly real value of
preserving local culture. Still, commentators typically disparage
cultural claims, usually either attacking their internal coherence or,
more often, exhibiting suspicion that protectionists invoke culture as
a smoke screen for purely self-interested policies designed to benefit
politically influential commercial interests.Y
Thus, typical analyses support the U.S. position. Although
10. See, e.g., Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to
Be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
165,187-89 (1995).
11. Interestingly, despite the similarity of many of the issues-that is, national
attempts to assure a rich local communications order in the face of global market forces-
the United States routinely invoked First Amendment values-freedom of information
and freedom of the press-to attack UNESCO, while changing to an "economic parlance"
to oppose Europe and Canada in the dispute about cultural products. Fred H. Cate, The
First Amendment and the International "Free Flow" of Information, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 371,
407 (1990). Maybe the United States feels less confident in lecturing Western Europe and
Canada on what democracy means.
12. See, e.g., Amy E. Lehmann, Note, The Canadian Cultural Exemption Clause and
the Fight to Maintain an Identity, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 187, 206-13 (1997);
Van Harpen, supra note 10, at 174-80. But cf Murray, supra note 6, at 223-24 (concluding
that the French protectionist position was public-good oriented, not rent-seeking, from the
perspective of public choice theory).
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commentators admit that non-economic values might be considered,
they find ways to disparage reliance on such values. Most important,
the economic reasoning fundamental to the U.S. position normally
remains unchallenged in the academic literature, especially within the
legal academy. 3 Part II of this Essay critiques that traditional
reasoning on the basis of the special qualities of media products. As
noted, I offer three types of critiques of international free trade-
critiques based (1) on the non-rivalrous-use aspect of most media
products; (2) on positive and negative externalities created by media
products; and (3) on the way that markets identify and weigh
preferences for media products. In order to show that the problems
13. A few of the best articles on these trade disputes do challenge the simple
economic argument as I have presented it. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the
Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade, National Identity, and Canada's Cultural
Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 247-49 (1998); Shao, supra note 2, at
119-36; Richard L. Matheny, III, Comment, In the Wake of the Flood: "Like Products"
and Cultural Products After the World Trade Organization's Decision in Canada Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 257-59 (1998). In each case,
however, I will argue that the author is more averse to protectionism than is appropriate
(though less averse than many others) either because of inadequacies in his development
of the economic critique or because of related inadequacies in his conception of culture.
14. I generally accept the claims that the law of "comparative advantage" results in
benefits of free trade and the view that international free trade is generally desirable,
although the devil is often in the details. Thus, this Essay offers no general critique of free
trade, but rather focuses on special aspects of media products that justify restrictions on
trade in this context. There are naysayers to the free trade position, though. See, e.g.,
Noam Chomsky, Free Trade and Free Markets: Pretense and Practice, in THE CULTURES
OF GLOBALIZATION 356, 356-70 (Fredric Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 1998). For
example, at the theoretical level, a common claim is that the market induces firms to seek
profits as much by taking wealth from labor as by increasing efficiency, see infra note 155
and accompanying text, and that a major aspect of increased freedom of international
trade, which expands the mobility of capital, is to increase capital's power in the fight with
labor over the distribution of wealth rather than to increase total wealth. Moreover, even
those whose livelihoods depend on free trade can question the terms on which it takes
place. Only this observation can explain why longshoremen played a prominent role in
the Seattle demonstrations during the January 2000 World Trade Organization meeting as
well as in shutting down West Coast ports with job actions in solidarity with the
demonstrators. See David Moberg, After Seattle, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at 14, 14;
Bill Mongelluzzo, Dockers Return to Work After WTO Protest, J. COM., Dec. 2, 1999, at
16, 16; Kim Murphy & Nancy Cleeland, Labor Unions Revive Powerful Past as WTO
March Looks to New Future, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4,1999, at A18.
More empirically, some critics ask whether the data actually show the supposed
benefits of the law of comparative advantage. For example, one critic observes that in the
20 years before Mexico embraced a development strategy based on free trade in 1983, its
economy grew at an average of 6% a year, with growth varying between roughly 4% and
11%. During the dozen years after it embraced free trade, its economy grew at an average
of 2% annually, varying from -4% to 4% a year. And although trade exports rose during
this period by 450%, the rate of productivity increase fell, most people's real incomes fell,
and income inequality increased. See Carlos Rozo, Mexico's Failed Growth Strategy,
DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept. 1999, at 10, 10-11.
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cannot be corrected by trade-neutral domestic regulation, Part II
argues that international trade can exacerbate each of these
problems. Then, in Part III, I argue that a policy of "weak
protectionism" often makes sense. I proceed to suggest that people's
legitimate interest in limiting government's power to deny them
access to media or cultural products is better considered under human
rights law than under trade law. Before getting to these issues,
however, Part I of this Essay will comment on a democratic "dialogic"
conception of culture that responds to many doubts raised by critics
of protectionism. These comments not only increase the concreteness
of the economic analysis, but also suggest some normatively
appropriate limits to cultural protectionism-limits possibly already
embodied, although certainly ineffectively enforced, in non-trade
portions of international law.
I. CULTURE
The normal framing of the media trade policy dispute weighs
cultural claims against competing claims of economic efficiency. This
Essay is primarily about the economic side of the debate. Still, some
consideration should be given to what is at stake under the label of
"culture." The term "culture" is notoriously difficult to define. 5 This
difficulty reflects more than its ubiquitousness and plasticity and the
fact that culture can take different forms, such as high, ethnic, and
popular, among others. 6 Rather, the difficulty also reflects different
commentators' use of the term as a surrogate for very different
concerns.
This potential for different conceptions of culture reflecting
different concerns is evident in disputes about trade. Scholarly
treatments sympathetic to the United States's free trade position
typically recognize the presumptive legitimacy of the concern with
cultural values, 7 but then proceed to denigrate its significance in one
15. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 87 (1985) ("Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the
English language."); John David Donaldson, "Television Without Frontiers": The
Continuing Tension Between Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 90, 147 (1996) ("Without doubt, culture is one of the most difficult
and problematic English terms to define due to its amorphous and inherently subjective
nature.").
16. See Goodenough, supra note 13, at 209-10.
17. See, e.g., Shao, supra note 2, at 136-37. This respectful treatment is much less
universal in the political sphere. U.S. Ambassador Carla Hills called the European quotas
for television" 'blatantly protectionist[,] unjustifiable, and discriminat[ory].'" Donaldson,
supra note 15, at 109 (quoting Ambassador Hills) (alterations in original). Similarly, U.S.
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way or another.18 A close reading of the literature, however, reveals
that these scholars' implicit conception of culture differs from a
second conception held by many defenders of national rights.1 9
Supporters of free trade typically invoke what I label a "museum,"
"commodity," or "artifact" conception of culture, which considers
culture and cultural integrity to be content-oriented.20 Based on this
conception, free trade advocates are right to question whether its
value justifies trade restraints. Even as they quote and initially
purportedly credit foreign claims for culture, however, these scholars
do not hear the protectionist arguments or comprehend the
conception of culture invoked.
Consider the nature of the artifact view of culture. In this view,
culture and cultural integrity are content-oriented and largely
backward-looking. Cultural integrity involves preservation of this
historical content. Undoubtedly, traditional cultural content often
merits respect; it would be wrong as well as ungenerous to uniformly
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor characterized the Canadian cultural identity
argument as an "'excuse' to "'protect the financial and economic viability of the
Canadian industry.' " Shawn McCarthy, U.S. Challenges Our Magazine Law: Asks World
Trade Group to Kill Tax on Split-Run Editions, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 12, 1996, at D2
(quoting Mickey Kantor), available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All; see
also Goodenough, supra note 13, at 207 (quoting the same language).
18. For example, Eli Noam does not deny that culture is "worthy of support," but
explains that his aim is to create skepticism and to show that these notions are "not
necessarily benign; they may well mask a form of information protectionism that serves
entrenched interests." ELI NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE 25 (1991). Similarly,
Donaldson exhibits considerable skepticism when he writes: "Few will argue that cultural
integrity and preservation are not worthy goals, but .... " and: "While cultural concerns
may be legitimate ..... " Donaldson, supra note 15, at 169 (emphases added).
19. In a discussion summarized below, see infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text,
Will Kymlicka identifies two visions of "cultural community" in terms that parallel the
argument here. A common view, which Kymlicka associated with communitarians and
conservatives such as Lord Devlin, see, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS passim (1965), identifies culture with some specific content and treats it as
inherently valuable to preserve. In contrast, Kymlicka argues that the liberal must
recognize empirically that membership in a cultural community is often crucial for
individual identity and enabling for individual agency. The (liberal) value of cultural
community ies in it being a necessary context of choice. But if serving "choice" is the
cultural community's value, then the importance of providing for the existence of a
context of choice cannot justify denying choice. Rather, members of a cultural community
should have the right to be constantly changing the community's specific content. See
WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 168-70,196 (1989).
20. I will use these terms interchangeably as context suggests. Their common feature
is that they all treat the crucial aspect of culture as its identifiable content. The museum
view emphasizes the historical claims made on behalf of that content. The commodity
view emphasizes that culture consists of items or intellectual property containing specific
content that can be possessed, valued, and (presumably) transferred. The artifact view
may be the most general, suggesting both of the above elements.
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condemn efforts at preservation or those who value these contents.2'
Still, many historical cultures, especially in their pure forms, are
vulnerable to criticisms. Too often, elites manipulate these historical
contents to deflect challenges to their rule, to justify historically
developed forms of domination, and to stifle liberating change. In the
extreme, preservation treats people as constituting a "living museum"
in which the "natives" live as exhibits. Sectarian systems are kept
pure. Aboriginals, Third World patriarchal cultures, and maybe even
Frenchmen are seen as interesting specimens.3 Identifying culture
with particular content invites the question of whether the culture is
worth preserving-as illustrated by a critic of protectionism who,
after implicitly asking this question, quoted Canadian "[a]rtists of the
cultural industry... equat[ing] 'Canadian content' with 'crap.' )23
Of course, free trade can threaten preservation of the museum.
Any liberal commentator, however, even if admitting that the loss of
any historical culture impoverishes the world in some respects, must
question the justness of forcing preservation when the bulk of the
people would like to change, for example, by watching American
television. Free trade advocates note that some people within these
societies gain by keeping their cultures roughly the way they are, but
also observe that others do not. Thus, the free trade advocate
properly questions how much should be given up for preservation-
how much oppression can be justified in its name. The advocate asks
who benefits and who pays, often with the implicit suggestion that
certain elites benefit and that members of the broader public, who are
denied the imported cultural goods they want, pay.
Contrast this artifact conception of culture with a second one,
which I will refer to as the "discourse" or "dialogic" conception. The
notion of discourse or dialogue makes participants, rather than
content, central to culture. In this conception, the primary audience
of a cultural product is other members of the same community.
21. Cf. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 passim (1995) (examining laws
regarding the protection of cultural property in the United States); Sarah Harding,
Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 72 IND. L.J. 723 passim
(1997) (assessing the validity of various theoretical justifications for the repatriation of
Native American cultural artifacts under federal law).
22. After I defended trade restrictions in cultural products at a conference, a
participating economist in a private side remark rhetorically asked me: "Surely you don't
think the French are worth preserving, do you?"
23. Lehmann, supra note 12, at 200 (quoting Hester Riches, Faith in the Future,
VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 22, 1995, at B2, available in WL database, Canadian Newspapers,
PAPERSCAN) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Members' speech to other members of the community often is
contextually specific, even if universal meaning can sometimes be
found in the particulars. Content with an overtly universal
orientation is frequently devoid of much relevance for the cultural
discourse. In this dialogic conception, culture is a living practice.
Like all practice, discourses of identity and value require a context,
which makes heritage crucial. Thus, this second conception treats
culture as the integration of a specific heritage into a current
behavioral discourse. Addition, development, and, sometimes,
rejection of cultural content are inherent in this conception of culture.
Rather than to preserve specific, backward-looking content, the
relevant protectionist goal is to assure an adequate context for
participation of members of the cultural community and to provide
resources for the dialogic participants. Protection of culture in this
context means assuring that members of the cultural community have
meaningful opportunities to be cultural "speakers."2 4  Culture as
dialogue emphasizes both a past as context and a present as an arena
for affirming, critiquing, and transforming identity.
This discourse conception of culture is implicit in defenses of a
cultural exception to free trade principles. It has been a constant, for
instance, in Canada. Even in the 1920s, a Canadian editorial by
Frederick Paul argued that" ' "[n]ational periodicals allow people in
the different parts of [the country] to understand one another's
viewpoints, which is the first step towards co-operation and the
removal of grievances." ' "I In the 1990s, Raymond Chretien, the
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, saw the trade issue as
centering on "the ability to maintain viable, home-grown cultural
industries that tell us about ourselves. '26 In approving the Canadian
24. Any reader familiar with my prior work on freedom of speech will recognize a
similarity. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1989); C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1181 (1994)
(reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993)). I have emphasized
freedom of speech as an aspect of individual liberty-the right of a speaker to speak and a
listener to listen to those willing, protected speakers. This liberty focus can be contrasted
with a market place of ideas theory in which content is crucial-in which "[w]hat is
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1965).
25. Magder, supra note 5, at 7 (quoting VIPOND, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Paul,
supra note 5, at 2)) (alterations in original). Of course, free trade might be hoped to do
the same at the global level, but even the fulfillment of this aspiration would not reduce
the essential need to promote understanding and cooperation within smaller political
units. See infra Part II.E.
26. Andrew M. Carlson, The Country Music Television Dispute: An Illustration of the
Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protectionism and American Entertainment Exports,
6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585,609 (1997).
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law that prohibited Canadian advertisers from placing advertising
directed toward Canadians in split-run (basically foreign)
magazines,27 Ted Magder, a communications scholar who has taught
in both Canada and the United States, argued that "the Canadian
government made a choice between the speech rights of Canadian
magazine publishers addressing Canadian readers, and the speech
rights of Canadian advertisers."' Similarly, in explaining the
fundamental importance of the Canadian broadcasting system,
former Canadian Minister of Communications Flora McDonald
asserted that "'[i]t plays a major role in defining our national,
regional, local[,] and even our individual identities.' ,29 As the
Canadian-born Magder explained, "[m]ost of all, culture is an
ongoing dialogue, a conversation about who we are and who we want
to be. '30
The same dialogic conception has been crucial to the European
position. In attempting to explain the "the European mind," an
American academic, although critical of the European Community's
Television Without Frontiers Directive,31 noted that the Europeans
resist total domination of market forces in part because of "the vital
role broadcasting has played in the development of informed
democratic political discourse. '32  French President Francois
Mitterrand argued that the question raised by free trade" 'is the right
of each country to forge its imagination and to transmit to future
generations the representation of its own identity.' ,33 "Forging" is an
active, essentially dialogic process that, Mitterrand emphasized, must
involve the people of the country. "Transmitting" does not imply
forcing an artifact on a future generation that they must then
preserve, but rather giving them access to a heritage. Culture being
27. Split-run magazines are magazines produced in two or more editions with all or
mostly the same editorial content. The primary difference usually is advertising directed
at a different group of consumers-for example, a Canadian edition of an American
magazine might have Canadian advertising and maybe one or two Canadian stories or a
Canadian cover.
28. Magder, supra note 5, at 50. He explained that magazines "are an important
forum for the expression of the ideas, attitudes and values of the reading communities they
represent." Id. (emphasis added).
29. Lehmann, supra note 12, at 197 (quoting McDonald).
30. Ted Magder, Going Global, CANADIAN F., Aug. 1999, at 11, 15.
31. The 1989 Directive, among other elements, directed member states to require that
television broadcasting contain at least 50% European content, as therein defined and
subject to certain exceptions. See, e.g., Lawrence G.C. Kaplan, The European
Community's "Television Without Frontiers" Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate
Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255,256 (1994).
32. Donaldson, supra note 15, at 145.
33. Shao, supra note 2, at 137-38 (quoting Mitterand) (emphasis added).
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crucial to identity does not imply a need to preserve any specific
cultural content. Rather, culture is a historically developed context in
which those whose identity is at stake participate. Moreover, "the
right of each country" does not require (or arguably even permit)
limits on the cultural possibilities considered by the participants. As
one group of European leaders has indicated, the watchwords of
cultural protectionists are pluralism, diversity, and citizen
opportunity, choice, creativity, and participation 4 Significantly, the
dialogic conception of culture emphasizes the desirability and
necessity of people considering or forging identity in a grounded and
internally accepted manner.
Cultural discourse arguably is distorted and its helpfulness to
people is reduced to the extent that the profit needs of market-
oriented firms, rather than the creative and normative impulses of
human creators, determine its content. Importantly, this view of
distortion does not claim that a culture has an essentially "right"
content or that culture has a specific historical content that needs to
be preserved. Rather, the focus is on the integrity of the cultural
process. The normative claim is that, whatever its evolving content,
culture should reflect more the discourse of civil society and the
lifeworld than the self-directed logic of the economic subsystem." A
properly "living culture" embodies judgments that grow out of
34. See INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON CULTURAL POL'Y, FINAL REPORT: PuTING
CULTURE ON THE WORLD STAGE passim (1998) (reporting on the results of an
international meeting of Ministers of Culture from 20 countries, held in Ottawa, Canada,
June 29-30, 1998) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The Stockholm Action Plan of an
Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, see id. at 24-30, the
result of an earlier meeting in Stockholm, March 30 to April 2, 1998, exhibited an attitude
to culture very different from the commodity perspective promoted by the United States.
The "plan" stated that "cultural goods and services [are] ... not like other forms of
merchandise," id. at 28, and emphasized the need for governments to support "the
development of a local, creative and participatory cultural life and pluralistic management
of diversity," id. at 27.
35. See C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317,374-
80 (1998) (describing this view of distortion from a democratic perspective). Jtlrgen
Habermas effectively argues that pathologies occur due to colonialization of aspects of the
lifeworld and public sphere by the system realms of the market and bureaucratic power.
He shows that "[u]nlike the material reproduction of the lifeworld, its symbolic
reproduction cannot be transposed onto foundations of system integration without
pathological side effects." 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION 322-23 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987); see id. at 304-05, 311-12, 330, 345. The
liberating cultural and political potential of the mass media, with feet in realms of both the
lifeworld and the systems worlds of the state and economy, is undermined to the extent
that the imperatives of the latter control its role in the former. See JORGEN HABERMAS,
THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger trans.,
1989); 2 HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra, at 389-91.
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people's own experiences and their efforts at self- and world-
understanding. Critics of market influences claim that the market, in
contrast, generates culture to serve its internal system needs-that is,
profit maximization. More concretely, critics often conclude that the
market mainly promotes culture with particular commodified content
and materialist values. Some forms of trade protectionism (often also
involving subsidies to domestic non-market cultural products) could
help a country restrict this market colonization of culture and
empower less market-dominated bases of discourse. Thus, an
international meeting of cultural ministers has observed that "the
production and distribution of cultural works cannot be left to the
marketplace alone," and the Greek Minister of Culture has argued
that "some protection [is needed] in order to respect and preserve
political, aesthetic and ideological liberalism."36
International (and American) critiques of U.S. media products
regularly deplore their consumerist, individualist, and materialist
orientation, as well as their cultural shallowness.37 Under the rubric
of defending the importing country's domestic culture, this critique
may represent, in part, resistence to that ideological content. Still,
this content-based concern is hardly the only ground for defending
domestic culture. The defense can reflect people's views about the
appropriate discursive or internal process of national cultural life as
much or more than any claim about this cultural life's content."
Of course, trade restraints that favor domestic cultural industries
are no panacea. They will not necessarily protect a free, undistorted
domestic culture. The optimistic hope is that a country will design a
regulatory regime to increase the independence of a public sphere
from both governmental and market distortions. Nevertheless, state
regulatory regimes sometimes merely replace market distortion with
governmental distortion. In the United States, this evil is partially
blocked by the First Amendment. In contrast, reliance on a free
trade regime may do little to alleviate the danger of improper,
36. FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 14,16 (emphasis added).
37. This ideological tilt may be a predictable economic consequence of producing
media for international distribution. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
38. Thus, although making the content critique when he notes that "[t]he claim of the
cultural imperialists is that global cultural industries are pushing all human cultures toward
the culture of consumer capitalism," Daniel Hallin illustrates this dialogic emphasis when
he states as obvious "that issues of access, voice, the representation of diverse social
interests and the creation of dialogue among themo belong today at the forefront of the
agenda for ... media politics." Daniel C. Hallin, Broadcasting in the Third World- From
National Development to Civil Society, in MEDIA, RrrUAL AND IDENTITY 153, 164, 162
(Tamar Liebes & James Curran eds., 1998).
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distortive governmental regulation. Governments that would impose
content censorship presumably could do so on a geographically non-
discriminatory basis, thereby adhering to free trade mandates.
More generally, an international legal order that permits
protectionism hardly guarantees that a country will regulate to
prevent the commercial distortion of its culture. At best, the
protectionist option allows and invites each country to struggle over
the extent and form of commercialization of its cultural spheres. A
free trade regime, however, can seriously impede a country's
resistence to commercialized distortion. Free trade rules might
enable foreign commercialized media to overwhelm domestic non-
commercialized media or at least to make subsidization much more
expensive.39 Still, as compared to international commercialization,
even unimpeded domestic commercialization may be more
responsive to internal needs and domestically salient issues.
Domestic commercialization is likely to manifest a greater focus on
specifically domestic demand and to embody the background
experience and interests of the local people that domestic firms are
more likely to employ to create domestic content. Thus, both
domestic non-market and domestic market media are likely to
contribute to a "discursive" culture-that is, a dynamic reflection or
meditation on identity and on collective problems, values, policies,
and ambitions, that is grounded in a particular heritage.
The policy implications of this dialogic conception of culture are
very different from those suggested by the artifact or museum view.
The goal of the dialogic conception is to maintain (or create) a
dynamic local cultural discourse. This goal requires preserving (or
creating) local cultural industries. It could justify both direct and
indirect subsidies-for example, screen or broadcast percentage
quotas providing guaranteed space for domestic products-as well as
some discriminatory burdens on imports, especially burdens designed
to enhance opportunities for domestic cultural products.
Nevertheless, because the value of culture lies in it being a context for
choice, any categorical exclusion of imports should not be allowed
because it would stunt discourse. Accordingly, a Canadian
government advisory group, while proclaiming governmental policy
39. In the GATr negotiations, the United States offered to compromise its free trade
position concerning the illegitimacy of film subsidies if the subsidizing country would
agree to give its subsidies to Hollywood too! See French Do Not See Culture as a Good to
Be Bought and Sold, IRISH TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1993, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library,
News Group File, Beyond Two Years; Julie Wolf, GATT Talks Stumble on Films and
Flying, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 8,1993, at 15.
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objectives of developing "Canadian cultural content" and ensuring
that it "is available to all Canadians," has emphasized that this should
be done "without limiting [Canadians'] access to foreign cultural
products." 4
In contrast, the artifact conception limits itself to preserving
heritage or, at most, to adopting or creating conforming additions that
illuminate and maintain that heritage. Preservation could require
fanatical protectionism. Exclusion of all "polluting" outside content
would be necessary. Interestingly, this illiberal practice might seem
more comprehensible to free trade advocates, who often attribute this
goal to cultural protectionists, than to the actual defenders of a
national cultural discourse. Although contrary to free traders'
interests, purity of local content and exclusion of outside content
make sense given the free traders' tendency to view culture as a
commodity or, at least, as a potentially possessable and, thereby,
saleable content.4' Conveniently, however, the extremism of a purity
goal-and the inevitable ineffectiveness of its implementation-make
such cultural protection efforts very vulnerable to the free traders'
critiques.
Free traders' museum or artifact conception of culture is evident
in their five main critiques of a cultural exemption to free trade
principles. Each criticism implicitly assumes the artifact conception,
but loses force against protectionists who value the dialogic
conception. First, some commentators question the positive value
and pedigree of "national" culture. Eli Noam, for example, argues
that the emphasis on national culture is largely a nineteenth century
innovation used by elites to manipulate subject populations and to
extract loyalty.42 The primary beneficiaries of allegiance to national
culture, he argues, are political elites who use it to prop up their rule
by generating hostility and sometimes violence against outsiders.
Noam's observations have obvious merit 3 and are related to why the
40. CULTURAL INDUS. SECrORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, CANADIAN
CULTURE IN A GLOBAL WORLD: NEW STRATEGIES FOR CULTURE AND TRADE 3 (1999)
(emphasis omitted) [hereinafter NEW STRATEGIES].
41. Thus Magder characterizes Jack Valenti's view as considering "culture as
something that is fixed and immutable," although for Valenti this reflected a view that
Hollywood's products, despite their appeal, would not" 'tear a nation's allegiance from its
culture,' " and thus that free trade would not create any problem. Magder, supra note 30,
at 15 (quoting Valenti, head of the Motion Picture Association of America).
42. See NOAM, supra note 18, at 23. Noam also observes that sometimes protection of
national culture is used as a mask for "information protectionism that serves entrenched
interests." Id. at 25; see Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and
the Global Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667 passim (1994).
43. For current examples, Noam easily could refer to Serbian and other Balkan
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merits of nationalism as a social phenomenon are a matter of
continuing controversy. His objection, however, has force only
against particular uses and particular contents of national culture-
presumably not against a nationalistic dialogic practice of people
trying to make sense of themselves in a modem world. In any event,
the imminent disappearance of either nation-states or nationalism is
doubtful. Although some forms of participatory global politics may
develop,"4 any democratic politics will long be grounded largely in
independent sovereign states and in subgroups and sub-jurisdictions
of these nation-states.45 As long as this situation holds, the policy
question should concern the necessary conditions for a "good" or
"liberal"-that is, a more open and more democratic-nationalism.
Surely these conditions include the preservation (or creation) of both
national and local subgroup discourses. 6 This dialogic conception of
culture discredits oppressive historical uses of national cultural
politics. From this dialogic perspective, the issue becomes how to
distinguish protectionism that supports an open and vibrant discourse
from protectionism that undermines the discourse's openness and
fairness.
Second, free trade advocates often question the depth of national
culture. Their characterizations can reduce distinctly Canadian
culture to two guys sitting before a map of Canada, talking about beer
and hockey.47 Similarly, given the multiplicity of nations and cultures
in Europe, commentators wonder whether protectionist quotas for
European-produced television-which presumably still allows
nationalisms. In an excellent, sensitive article, Oliver Goodenough notes that having a
foreign threat may be useful or even necessary for nation-building. The battle over
cultural protectionism, for example, could itself help establish the United States as the
enemy and create a Canada, defined as "not United States." Goodenough, supra note 13,
at 247-49. Thus, the "real point of the fight [over cultural protectionism] is the fight
itself." IL at 247. Goodenough concludes, however, that this strategy is fatally flawed.
By accepting the legitimacy of cultural protectionism and of the protected identity as a
basis of nationhood, he argues, cultural protectionists justify the unraveling of Canada,
first as Francophone Quebec secedes and then as the First Nations peoples exit. See id. at
250-52.
44. See infra Part II.E.
45. In this Essay, I use "nation-state" as the equivalent of "sovereign country," and
this usage implies nothing about the relation or lack of relation between the "state" and
the "nation."
46. See KYMLICKA, supra note 19, passim; Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public
Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, at 109, 109-42 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
47. See Lehmann, supra note 12, at 201. Lehmann also illustrates her complaint that
no one "has verbally articulated what [Canadian] identity is," with the Canadian joke that
"define[s] a Canadian as an unarmed American with Medicare." Id. at 200.
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dominance by a few firms that can ignore most more specific cultures
contained in Europe-can possibly be premised on a concern for
culture rather than merely on advantage for European cultural
industries. Critics of protectionism question the reality of this
European culture, asking whether Spain actually has more in
common culturally with Sweden than with Argentina.49 But again,
the critics are treating culture as specific content-an object or
artifact. They are right, for instance, in noting that a great deal of
England's cultural content, including its language, is more like that in
the United States than in Greece. A dialogic conception, however,
answers these objections. If Europe hopes to forge governmental and
other collective institutions in which people relate on grounds of
equality and respect, then it needs to foster a European discourse.
For that purpose, people in Greece are more relevant to the British
than are Americans. Moreover, the legitimacy of protecting
discourses against domination by global trade-the premise that
allows legal protection of "European" culture-also authorizes
additional domestic laws protecting Europe's many, more local,
national cultures. Dialogues oriented to forging and understanding
"national" identity (or identities), whatever the current depth of these
identities, are crucial for a democratic political order.
Free trade advocates' third claim argues that "[u]sing the nation
as a cultural unit is to some extent arbitrary." 50 Protectionism makes
little sense on cultural grounds because "[c]ulture is often more alien
across social classes and age groups than across borders." 51 Cultures,
such as youth culture or proletarian culture, provide many people
with their central foci.52 This point, of course, is persuasive if culture
is identified with people's habits and perceptions. The claim looks at
what cultural content, what artifacts, play a major role in people's
lives-not at what dialogues need nurture. National culture may not
be intrinsically a more vital part of a person's life than various
transnational categories. Nevertheless, the nation as a cultural unit is
hardly arbitrary if the concern is the discourse of people living in the
same area, especially people who potentially participate in the same
political order and who are bound by the same laws. The nation can
48. See Donaldson, supra note 15, at 154. Noam suggests that the motives behind
"[e]fforts to create a common European cultural front against Hollywood ... have often
been suspiciously economical." NOAM, supra note 18, at 24.
49. See, e.g., NOAM, supra note 18, at 24; Donaldson, supra note 15, at 150; Shao,
supra note 2, at 140.
50. NOAM, supra note 18, at 23.
51. Id.
52. See Shao, supra note 2, at 140.
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provide a central, grounded locus of dialogue about identity, values,
and politics. Moreover, only national sovereignty authorizes market
interventions to protect or enhance subgroup identity and dialogue as
a means of supporting a meaningful pluralist or multicultural
democracy 3 Thus, from a dialogic perspective, the importance of a
national democratic discourse justifies resistence to automatic
acceptance of free trade rules.
Similarly, free trade advocates suggest that the protectionists'
focus on the nation is arbitrary because ethnic culture does not track
national borders. 4 Cultural integrity is an arbitrary value, they argue,
because few cultures are pure; rather, they are themselves mixtures of
different cultures.55 In fact, the United States, the land of immigrants,
presumably embodies all European (as well as most of the rest of the
world's) cultures-a factor sometimes suggested as a reason for the
international success of Hollywood products. 6 Again, this point has
force only if the protectionists' concern is with the quality or purity of
a museum culture, of some particular historical cultural system. True,
"any governmental trade measure aiming at cultural specificity [is
arbitrary]. 57 The claim that "a Canadian from Toronto has more in
common with a Bostonian than with someone from Alberta"58 is
surely right for some purposes-at least, for some people in Boston
and Toronto. Nonetheless, the Toronto citizen has much more in
common with the person in Alberta, even when they disagree, when
the issue is selecting a Prime Minister and probably when the issue is
considering relations with the First Nations peoples, determining
whether health insurance is a national or regional issue, or deciding
how to relate to the United States. In other words, the Toronto and
Alberta residents have in common the issues themselves. If Canada is
to exist as a country, it almost certainly is more important for the
person from Toronto to hear the views of people from Alberta and
Quebec than from people in Boston.5 9 The crucial concern is with the
53. See Baker, supra note 35, at 383-87 (arguing that a preferable complex theory of
democracy would require interventions when, as likely, the market did not adequately
support media for subgroups within society).
54. See NOAM, supra note 18, at 23; Donaldson, supra note 15, at 151; Shao, supra
note 2, at 146.
55. See Shao, supra note 2, at 140. Shao's focus on culture as an artifact with
particular content as opposed to a discourse is also evident in his complaint about the
difficulty of "delineat[ing] a particular culture at a given time." Id.
56. See NOAM, supra note 18, at 22.
57. Shao, supra note 2, at 140.
58. Nina Munk, Culture Cops, FORBES, Mar. 27, 1995, at 41, 42, quoted in
Goodenough, supra note 13, at 253 n.153.
59. The cross-border connections, however, are not always irrelevant. Because some
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maintenance and quality of a participatory discourse.
The fourth criticism made by free traders is that even if cultural
integrity is worth protecting, protectionist measures may be ill-
designed to achieve that goal.' From the artifact view of culture, this
objection is correct. The European Community's local-content
requirement, for example, may be "entirely ineffective at encouraging
programs produced in Europe or elsewhere that promote European
culture."'61 The requirement relates more to employment than to
meaningful cultural content. Thus, U.S. programming, such as an
American documentary on European art, "may promote European
culture more than European programs." 62 This criticism, however,
clearly assumes a concern with "content" rather than with
"discourse." For example, a quality American film on the French
Revolution could contribute more as an accessible representation of
French history, even for the French, than a French knock-off of an
American game show.63 European television quotas that advantage
the latter over the former seem particularly ill-suited for preserving
French culture. From the perspective of preserving space for people
engaged in a national discourse, however, the rules make sense, even
if the quality of the discourse is sometimes questionable (and, often
questioned).
Fifth, protectionism purportedly encourages parochialism in a
country's cultural industries, while free trade allegedly allows these
domestic industries to show the world their quality as well as to
induce them to produce more popular, and hence more desirable,
material.' 4 Even if the economic premises of this suggestion were
plausible, 5 it assumes that the value of culture lies in the universal
appeal of its content rather than in its appeal to domestic audiences.
groups within a state will identify with those outside, some forms of protectionism-for
example, a Canadian law restricting access to French culture-might seriously hamper
some Canadians' participation in internal Canadian discourse.
60. See Donaldson, supra note 15, at 174-75 & n.491; Shao, supra note 2, at 140.
61. Donaldson, supra note 15, at 174-75.
62. Id. at 175 n.491 (citing Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Television
Programming and GATT An Analysis of Why the European Community's Local
Program Requirement Violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 10 INT'L TAX
& Bus. LAW. 97,134 (1993)).
63. See id. at 170-71.
64. Lehmann recommends that Canada can best preserve its culture by "open[ing] its
doors and eliminat[ing] borders" and "show[ing] the world its identity." Lehmann, supra
note 12, at 217-18. If the economics was plausible, this recommendation would make
considerable sense if culture is a particular content, but not if it is a dialogue among a
nation's citizens.
65. But see infra Part ll.A (arguing that markets are ineffective at producing "public
goods").
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If cultural value lies specifically in members of a national community
speaking to other members, which is the claim of the discourse
theory, the proposal is unhelpful. Even if free trade enabled a nation
to export plenty of cultural material, it could also impoverish the
domestic cultural dialogue if it caused the nation's cultural industry to
change its content to compete better internationally, but to speak less
directly or subtly to domestic audiences.
Although free trade advocates purport to recognize the
protectionists' concern for culture, the two groups talk about very
different things-a museum or artifact culture on the one hand and a
dialogic culture on the other.' A crucial subsidiary point is that the
two conceptions of culture have very different policy implications.
Free trade advocates view culture as particular content, and cultural
products are ultimately valued or disvalued because of good or bad
features of their content. Protection of culture under this museum or
artifact conception requires rules that block outside content or that at
least limit its availability sufficiently to prevent successful challenges
to a country's traditional cultural content. Free traders are correct
that, historically, some authoritarian-often sectarian-regimes have
tried to protect or promote culture as conceived here, usually not only
with censorious import restrictions, but also with severe internal
limits on expressive freedoms. More importantly, free traders are
right to object to the protectionist policy that this conception
suggests.
The free traders' critique, however, misses the point if the
cultural concern is with protecting internal creative and discursive
processes as well as the conceptual resources that a local heritage
makes available for such processes. The key policy implication of the
discourse conception of culture is the need to maintain and nourish
domestic media. Outside content cannot be excluded, however,
because it too can contribute usefully to local discursive processes
about national and subgroup identities and their social and political
needs. Given this goal, the often-observed fact that few countries
have a monolithic culture does not negate-indeed is not even
relevant to-the propriety of trade restrictions. Rather, from the
discourse view, border restraints are legitimate if they help to protect
diverse internal sources from decimation without excluding outside
content. Intelligent democratic media policy also probably requires
66. For the protectionists, this is somewhat of an overstatement. Although I have
given examples of an emphasis on the dialogic conception, cultural protectionists often are
not specific and sometimes appear to mix the two notions.
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non-market internal policies to promote subgroups' self-
understanding and their participation within the country's overall
cultural and political processes. Unrestricted international free trade
could block some policies to promote both national and subgroup
public spheres that rely heavily on local products. Moreover, by
reducing the ranks of people employed in domestically oriented
media production, competition from cheap global media products
could undermine the economic viability of professional participation
in national discourses. In other words, many of the free traders'
objections to cultural protectionism are well taken when applied to
the target as they conceive it, but their arrows completely miss most
protectionists' legitimate concerns.
II. ECONOMICS
Acceptance of the market's merits has achieved considerable
hegemony. Although general critiques are common, I will not take
them up here. Instead, I want to consider whether media products
have special attributes that undermine the general assumption that
markets achieve proper outcomes in this context.
The standard economic (and democratic) perspective treats
consumers' own evaluations of their needs and interests as
"sovereign." This consumer sovereignty approach is questionable in
some contexts, most obviously when the consumer is a child.
Nevertheless, even accepting this standard economic perspective, my
claim is that markets predictably and dramatically fail to provide
appropriate production and distribution of media products. This Part
considers three analyses supporting this assertion.67 First, markets
work well only with respect to "private goods." But because media
products have substantial "public good" aspects-specifically,
substantially non-rivalrous use of media content-markets fail to
produce enough, and they sometimes favor less-desired media
products. Second, markets work only if goods are properly priced,
that is, priced at roughly their true cost. Substantial negative and
positive externalities of media products result in improper pricing.
This pricing leads to excessive demand and over-supply of media
products with substantial negative externalities and to too little
demand for and production of those with positive externalities.
Third, markets work well given the premise that they properly
identify and measure people's preferences. Identification takes place
67. These three analyses are developed more extensively in Baker, supra note 8, at
322-411.
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only within market transactions, and measurement is based on an
individual's willingness and ability to pay. Significantly, there is
nothing "objectively" correct or accurate about this method of
identification or its results. Although all capitalist societies rely on
market-based identification and measurement for many purposes, all
democracies reject these methods for other purposes.6 Many, though
maybe not all, media products have important traits that are similar
to those for which societies rely on non-market measures of people's
values or preferences. This similarity makes reliance on the market at
least questionable.
If markets fail to provide the media products that people want,
then governmental interventions or, in some cases, non-market,
voluntaristic actions, are necessary. This conclusion, however, is not
relevant to the dispute over free trade unless domestic and foreign
media products differ in ways relevant to how markets in these goods
fail. International trade law generally does not forbid regulation.
Rather, it primarily requires "national treatment" -that is, the
application of the same rules to domestic and foreign goods and no
other disfavorable treatment to foreign products. If markets in both
domestic and imported media products create the same problems,
free trade principles presumably would not prevent responsive
regulations aimed equally at both. For example, if consumption of
pornography is unacceptable, a ban on sales of both foreign and
domestic pornography should not offend trade law.69 Thus, each of
the three analyses must consider whether international free trade
exacerbates market failures in ways that justify differential treatment
of foreign and domestic media products.
A. Public Goods and Monopolistic Competition
Markets do not adequately respond to demand for and,
therefore, are ineffective at producing pure "public goods"-those
68. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 64-91 (1983).
69. If, however, the concern is that production of pornography results in harm to the
people involved in its production (children for instance) and if the United States
(legitimately) asserts this concern only with respect to American children, then uniform
treatment of domestic and foreign child pornography is arguably constitutionally
overbroad. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), however, the Court apparently
rejected this view. Although the majority seemed not to consider the issue in the
overbreadth challenge, see id. at 774, Justice Stevens read the majority opinion to hold
that New York's interest in protecting children from exploitative use could justify its ban
on child pornography even though the ban applied to foreign films in which the child actor
resided abroad, see id. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
1378 [Vol. 78
FREE TRADE IN MEDIA PRODUCTS
goods the use of which is both "non-rivalrous," where one person's
use does not affect another's use, and "non-excludable," where no
one can be stopped from using an available good. Once Sue eats an
ice cream cone, which is a private good, it is not available to Sam.
However, the government's national defense system that protects Sue
unavoidably protects Sam too, even if he does not pay for it.
Providing a public good for one customer unavoidably benefits other
potential customers. An enterprise that cannot collect from all who
benefit, however, will have inadequate incentives to produce.
Media products, and intellectual property more generally, have
at least one public good characteristic: their use is substantially or
completely non-rivalrous due to the low cost, as in the case of print
media, or zero cost, as in the case of broadcast media, of providing
them to additional users. Still, media producers often can create a
substantial amount of "excludability," which allows them to charge
additional users. Of course, an initial reader can pass on a newspaper
or book, and an over-the-air broadcaster may be unable to exclude
any listening or viewing audience. On the other hand, desire for
possession, convenience, and contract or copyright terms often leads
to individualized purchases of books or newspapers. A film owner
can require a separate ticket for each moviegoer, scramble the film
when broadcast, or provide it over pay cable. Moreover, many media
providers transform some freely or cheaply available media content
into a different private good-namely, audience members' attention,
an excludable product that owners can then can sell to advertisers.
The centrality of excludability to the economic incentive to produce is
the reason the U.S. Constitution authorizes grants of copyright.
The key factor for the economic analysis here, however, is the
other public-good element: media products' substantially non-
rivalrous use. This element exists as long as copy costs of media
products are sufficiently low. And it differentiates media economics
from the economics of typical private goods-for example, the ice
cream cone mentioned above.
Unless a firm can adequately price discriminate-that is, sell to
different users at different prices-it will have inadequate incentives
to provide sufficient goods. Sometimes, it will have inadequate
incentives to provide the good at all, even though people collectively
value the good at more than it would cost to supply it.7' Even when
70. For example, assume that a good costs $12 to produce initially, but that copies are
costless, and that three potential purchasers are willing to pay $9, $5, and $3 respectively
for the good. If it is unable to engage in effective price discrimination, the producing firm
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the firm can produce a good, any selling price above zero, or
whatever the "copy cost" is, will exclude some potential users and
create an inefficiently restricted distribution.
Non-rivalrous use has both explanatory and policy relevance for
international trade. First, media outlets sell their products at radically
different prices from country to country.72 Commentators sometimes
disagree about how to characterize this difference. For most private
goods in competitive industries, substantially lower prices for foreign
sales strongly suggest "dumping," that is, selling at below cost.
International trade law considers dumping a major "sin" because the
dumped goods' low prices compete unfairly with those of the
importing country. Trade law agreements generally outlaw dumping
and often allow various defensive responses, including retaliation by
the receiving country.7 3 Non-rivalrous use, however, means that the
exported media product is not sold below cost because there are no
significant additional costs beyond those already incurred by
producing it for its domestic audience. The price differential occurs
because national borders segment markets, making price
discrimination easier. Unlike dumping, this price discrimination
presumably increases efficiency by making it profitable to produce
and more widely distribute goods that people want.74
Second, this public good aspect of media products explains the
commonly observed dominance of the United States in the
international trade in films and television programming.75 If the price
would have three pricing options to recover its costs: (1) to sell the good for at least $12 to
one customer; (2) to sell at $6 each to two customers; or (3) to sell at $4 each to three. The
result is that a good that costs $12 and is collectively valued at $17 (9 + 5 + 3) will not be
produced because the customers would not accept any of the company's pricing options.
71. In the example supra note 70, if the second user valued the good at $6, the firm
could cover its costs by selling the good for $6 each to two customers. However, this price
would exclude the third user even though it would cost nothing to supply this customer
too, and the customer would receive a $3 value by gaining access.
72. See WILDMAN & SINVEK, supra note 6, at 4-7.
73. See The World Trade Organization, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, pt. I, art. 2 (Apr. 15, 1994), reprinted
in H.R. DOC. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 1463 (1994) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/7:103-316V.1);
EDWIN VERMULST & PAUL WAER, E.C. ANT-DUMPING LAW AND PRACrIcE 3 (1996).
74. See WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 3-4; see also Shao, supra note 2, at 124
(recognizing that this price discrimination "in world markets is beneficial to the extent that
it reduces inefficiency").
75. Wildman and Siwek create a simple economic model that largely explains trade
patterns in media products based on this public good quality combined with several other
obvious assumptions, such as the existence of some preference for domestic culture and
language. See WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 2-3, 67-77. In contrast, Noam merely
creates confusion when he treats trade in audio-visual products as functionally equivalent
to trade in traditional private goods such as Swiss watches and New Zealand kiwi fruits.
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to a consumer is the same, a consumer typically prefers the stereo,
meal, car, or suit on which more was spent to produce, or, in other
words, which has better inputs. Of course, specific tastes of a
consumer for a particular item or a unique design can sometimes
override this tendency. So can the inaptness of a producer in the use
of even high quality inputs. Nevertheless, consumers seldom get this
choice-that is, seldom are goods that cost a lot to produce sold for as
low a price as are cheaply produced goods. Usually, the high product
cost means a higher price, which requires finding a consumer willing
and able to pay more. Therefore, purchasers typically must make a
trade-off between higher quality and lower price. Or, at least, this
trade-off holds true for most private goods.
For media goods, the dynamic is very different. As long as copy
costs are minimal, the production budget for a single item depends
not on the amount one individual will pay but on the number of such
paying consumers to which the firm can sell the single product (or its
cheap copies). The producer's opportunity to create a "better"
product-one with higher monetary inputs-is tied directly to the size
and wealth of the potential audience. Looking solely at domestic
markets, this fact means that media products in larger and wealthier
countries will have the largest production budgets, a situation that has
long permitted American producers to have large budgets.7 6
Now introduce international trade and hold constant other
factors, especially local tastes. If distributors sell domestic and
imported media products at the same price, consumers in all countries
generally should prefer the products with the higher budgets, typically
the American products. In reality, however, other factors cannot be
held constant. Most audiences prefer their own domestic content-
content in their own language and dealing with their own cultural
experiences and social issues. For the country with a large and
wealthy domestic audience, both the larger production budget and
See NOAM, supra note 18, at 15. Why he suggests this equivalence is difficult to
understand. Maybe he refuses to note the public good aspect of media products because
to do so would undermine his attempt to deny the structural economic basis of the
advantage that U.S. firms, that is, "Hollywood," have in the audio-visual arena. Unlike
Wildman and Siwek, Noam finds the export success of Hollywood's high cost producers
paradoxical. He tentatively explains the success by invoking various factors such as U.S.
concerns being universal and thus having foreign appeal and the United States being in the
technical forefront of filmmaking just as France is in winemaking. See id- at 21-23.
76. After putting aside countries with non-market economies, such as China,
Wildman and Siwek show that English speakers are the largest and wealthiest market and
that the United States clearly dominates as to English. See WiLDMAN & SIWEK, supra
note 6, at 85.
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the domestic content preference should favor the domestic product.
Predictably, then, Americans consume primarily American media
products." For countries with smaller domestic audiences over which
to spread costs, the U.S. advantage of a higher budget and the local
advantage of domestic content should push in opposite directions,
leading to some balance between imports and domestic products.
Logically, the proportion of consumption devoted to domestic media
products should increase the greater the size and wealth of a
country's domestic audience and the greater the separation between
its domestic culture and language and the culture and language of
exporting countries. Likewise, similarities between language and
culture help explain observed regional trading patterns. Still, the
larger production budgets permitted by the large and wealthy
domestic audiences predictably give American products a significant
advantage in the export market-precisely the result reported.78
This predictive analysis can be taken a step further. Eli Noam,
for instance, offers a simplified but useful approach that can explain
some of the impact of international trade on media content.79 Noam
suggests that a media producer might consider three types of content
inputs: domestic (D), universal (U), and foreign (F)-with the
assumption that, on average, domestic audiences will positively value
D and, perhaps to a lesser extent, U, but will disvalue F. A foreign
audience will have the reverse reactions to some of this content,
disvaluing the first country's D content and potentially valuing F (if it
is about them) but, like the domestic audience, will positively value
U.80 In creating media content, the economic prediction is that a
77. See id& at 22-26 (discussing the limited success of film imports in the United
States). In 1983, 2% of American television programming was imported, while every
other Latin American or European country (except for the Soviet Union at 8%) for which
there was data reported import percentages in the double digits, ranging up to 66% in
Ecuador and Iceland. See id. at 42-43.
78. See id& at 13-48, 83-98, 170-75. This economic logic need not be the only factor
contributing to American dominance. Some commentators describe American foreign
policy (imperialistic) initiatives as having contributed to the prevalence of U.S. products.
Others less persuasively attribute the popularity of U.S. products in part to Americans just
being better at this form of service production. See, e.g., NOAM, supra note 18, at 22.
79. See NOAM, supra note 18, at 18. Of course, any analytic modeling of audiences'
tastes or preferences must be designed to further the purpose of the modeling. Moreover,
as all television network programmers and Hollywood studio heads know, popular tastes
are sufficiently unpredictable that any modeling will be quite primitive.
80. Henceforth, I mostly ignore foreign content, F, because it is the least favored
content-at least for a producer from any country that has a significant domestic audience.
Of course, sometimes a producer will create content primarily for a particular foreign
market, especially a lucrative foreign market. For example, both Canadian and U.S.
companies operating in Canada for labor or location reasons sometimes produce content
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producer should include each element until its cost becomes greater
than the revenue its inclusion allows the producer to extract from
potential audiences. This model predicts that media products made
for domestic audiences will contain mostly D, some U, and little if any
F. Although producers might increase the amount of F if they believe
there is a potential for significant export sales, this approach has a
serious disadvantage in that F reduces the content's value to domestic
audiences. Therefore, generally the dominant strategy for a producer
seeking to export its creations is to increase U and sacrifice some D.
The amount of D sacrificed should increase as the portion of revenue
the producer expects to obtain from export markets rises. This
expectation of revenue should be greater for producers in any
country, in particular the United States, that has a natural trade
advantage due to larger program budgets reflecting the larger size
and wealth of its domestic market. This analysis indicates that
America's pro-free trade policy is not only economically
advantageous, but also is essentially a content-related media policy
that tilts production toward more U and less D.81
The precise content suggested by these symbols is not obvious.
Indeed, studio executives are paid handsomely for the treacherous
task of predicting audience appeal. Still, the categories' coverage is
not entirely opaque. Local language, complex dialogue, local humor,
references to local or national history and culture, themes dealing
with unresolved national issues, and even universal themes dealt with
through complex weaving of national or local cultural materials tend
to be heavily D. Although literary and film critics often praise such
primarily for the U.S. market. Similarly, many multinational media companies produce
and sell domestic content within a country in which they operate, even though the content
is foreign to the place where the companies are incorporated and where the bulk of their
equity owners live. Mostly, this and related complexities raise issues of corporate
globalization more than of trade law. See generally EDWARD S. HERMAN & ROBERT W.
MCCHEsNEY, THE GLOBAL MEDIA: THE NEW MISSIONARIES OF CORPORATE
CAPrrALISM (1997) (describing the corporate globalization of media firms). Of course,
domestic trade law must decide whether to characterize particular products as imports or
local.
81. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (holding that a
content-discriminatory law is presumptively unconstitutional); cf. Susan H. Williams,
Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 619-20 (1991)
(arguing that facially neutral laws that have significant content-discriminatory effects
should be treated constitutionally as content discriminatory). Contrary to strong dicta in
Turner, as long as a law's purpose is not to suppress certain content, content-oriented
media laws have, historically and appropriately, been regularly upheld against First
Amendment challenges; the merits of such laws should be judged as a policy matter. See
C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting.: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses,
1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57, 93-114.
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content, free trade disfavors it. Maybe the often-criticized
shallowness of American cultural products is less intrinsic to
American creativity or tastes-for example, does it apply to less
exported American theater?-than to the commercial realities of
producing these products for export. In contrast to these D items,
which the exporter should avoid, most observers believe action,
violence, sex, and slick production qualities have relatively universal
appeal. Thus, the predictions about content: American video
products will feature these U elements more than will the cultural
products of countries relying less on export revenues. Foreign
audiences will buy relatively large amounts of these American
imports, not so much because they affirmatively value this type of
content-they predictably would prefer more of their own D-but
because of U's relative acceptability, combined with the advantage of
the low price of these imports,s2 and the imports' use of large
production budgets to infuse the content with slick and appealing
production attributes.
So far, this analysis has been explanatory-accounting for the
leading role of the United States (Hollywood) in the media export
market and examining the impact this export trade predictably has on
content. Nothing said yet suggests any reason to object to U.S.
dominance, at least on economic or welfare grounds. To the contrary,
many observers assert that any trade restriction would cause a loss to
the people (consumers) of the importing country as well as to the
exporting country. n addition, as noted above, the enhanced
opportunity for price discrimination provided by national borders
should lead to more efficient levels of production. These conclusions
are the mainstay of the pro-free trade position. Nevertheless, an
evaluative inquiry provides substantial reasons to worry. Features of
competition in these semi-public goods can undermine the production
of the most valued cultural goods.
Audio-visual products in particular and media products in
general compete against each other and, to a lesser degree, against
other products and activities for audience time and money.
Predictably, American exports usually take market share from and to
some degree reduce demand for an importing country's domestic
media products.83 The economic viability of these exports also leads
82. See WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 4-7 (providing data noting the wide
variation of prices for which American television shows and films are sold in different
countries).
83. The lower price of the imports should cause an increase in the total size of the
market for media products. Unusual circumstances could be imagined where this
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them to take some American market share from those American
media products that have little or no export appeal. Of course, this
situation is not intuitively bad. Competition always produces winners
and losers. For a typical "private" good, competitive winners usually
satisfy consumer demand to a greater extent or at a cheaper cost than
their rivals. Producing a product that, due to competition, is no
longer economically viable wastes social resources. The export good
may be socially "efficient," while the failed domestic media product is
"inefficient."
Media products, however, are not typical private goods.
Assuming that media producers are unable to price discriminate
adequately, many media products will not be commercially viable
even though their creation and distribution would be a valuable use
of social resources. That is, many media products would satisfy a
demand that is greater than the cost of the goods, making their
production and distribution "efficient," even though they cannot be
sold profitably. In such situations, selling at a high price causes the
loss of too many customers to be profitable, while selling at a low
price does not produce enough revenue per customer s4 This market
expansion could result in some increase in demand for local media, a point suggested by
Gerry Neuman in conversation. Still, at least as long as the cost of producing local media
goods does not go down, the cheaper (or otherwise successful) imports normally will
replace, rather than increase demand for, local products.
84. Consider the following demand for a media product with real but low copy costs:
Person Demand (T2) Marginal Cost Average Cost Original Demand (Ti)
1 10 20 20 11
2 81/2 1 101/2 91/2
3 7 1 71/3 8
4 51/2 1 5 3/4 61/2
5 4 1 44/5 5
6 21/2 1 41/6 31/2
7 1 1 35/7 2
8 0 1 33/ 1/2
In this example, at the present time, T2, the average cost stays above the demand curve.
Therefore, without price discrimination, no selling price will allow the good to be sold
profitably. The value that the first seven people place on the product, however,
totals 38 1/2 (summing the individual demand), while the cost of providing the product for
these seven would be 26 (summing the marginal cost for each). Failure to produce the
product causes a lost welfare surplus of 12 1/2-an inefficient result.
If this demand curve at T2 represents a downward shift of 1 unit from an original
demand at an earlier time (Ti) due to the current entry of imports, this inefficient non-
production can be attributed to free trade. In the above hypothetical, without the
international competition, the original demand of five persons could have been fulfilled at
a selling price between 4 4/5 and 5, with a production cost of 24 and providing a value of 40
to consumers, generating a surplus of 16. Unless the import creates a surplus greater than
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failure, always possible, is predictably more common for media
products with comparatively smaller audiences.0 Thus, some,
possibly many, domestic media products, especially those with limited
audiences, fail due to competition from internationally traded
products, even though they remain in demand by the local audience.
In these circumstances, competition can drive those goods that are
most beneficial in consumer-welfare terms out of the market.
Similar effects occur in the United States. An increase in export-
oriented products causes the competitive failure of some smaller-
audience, domestic-oriented media products that U.S. audiences still
want. Using the categories described earlier, fewer American
products emphasizing D (domestic) content will be successful because
of competition with American products emphasizing U (universal)
content. Some informed observers conclude that this effect explains a
greater prevalence of violence, action, and sex in American products
than can be attributed to domestic audience preferences, as indicated
by the violent media products' comparatively poor domestic
performance in program ratings and audience reports. 86 Thus, in both
domestic and foreign markets, media products with culturally specific,
discursive content fail even when they are strongly valued by local
audiences and even though they would exist if free trade were subject
to appropriate restrictions. In this circumstance, free trade hurts
16 (plus enough to cover lost value from any additional small local media products whose
fate was like this hypothesized product), introducing international competition would
cause an inefficient loss of media valued by audiences. Whether this actually occurs, of
course, depends on the specific demand curves.
85. Because average costs go down continuously, if demand stays above the marginal
cost for a sufficiently large audience, there will be some price at which producing the good
will be profitable. Thus, the effect described in the text-inefficient non-production-
should occur more often for media products with comparatively smaller audiences. This
effect can be illustrated using the example supra note 84. In that particular hypothetical,
by tripling (actually, by slightly more than doubling) the number of people who want the
product at each price level, the good that failed in the example would be successful. If
priced at 2 1/2, the 18 people (3 x 6) who value the good at least 2 1/2 should pay up to 45
(18 x 2 1/2) for the product, which is more than the 37 that it costs to produce the good for
18 people (20 for the first copy plus 17 x 1 = 17 for the 17 copies). Thus, if the audience
size is tripled, the competition from the import would not eliminate the market for this
domestic good.
86. See George Gerbner, The Hidden Side of Television Violence, in INVISIBLE
CRISIS: WHAT CONGLOMERATE CONTROL OF MEDIA MEANS FOR AMERICA AND THE
WORLD 27, 32 (George Gerbner et al. eds., 1996) (reporting that non-violent
programming has higher Nielsen ratings than violent programming in the United States,
but that violent, action, and crime programming was much more likely to be exported).
As will be noted infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text, U is not of one mold. It may
also include content supporting such universal values as freedom, democracy, toleration,
and empathy-contents that some authoritarian elites may wish to restrict.
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consumers.
Free trade also can produce consumer benefits. People value the
imported products, otherwise they would not buy or watch. No
abstract economic theory can predict whether free trade generates
more loss or more gain in consumer welfare. Rather, the answer
depends on the specific shape of people's demand curves. There is,
however, no systematic reason to expect that those products which
are most desired by the public will prevail in a free market regime. In
fact, some economic considerations give reason to predict the
opposite. The domestic products most likely to fail are those that are
also among those most likely to generate a proportionately high
consumer surplus if produced and distributed. That is, the products
most likely to fail from a slight downward shift in the demand curve
caused by competition from exports include: (1) those with smaller
audiences;87 (2) those for which some of the audience have a
relatively high demand but for which the demand declines relatively
steeply;88 and (3) those for which opportunities for effective price
discrimination are especially unavailable 9 On the other hand, the
greater the degree to which one or another of these conditions does
not hold-and none hold for most major export products-the more
likely the media product will be produced and will be produced at a
level that generates proportionately little consumer or producer
surplus. Because these three qualities are more descriptive of
domestic media products, free trade is likely to cause a loss of
consumer welfare as compared to a well designed set of trade
regulations. Specifically, trade rules that increase the likelihood of
survival of those domestic products that would barely fail under a free
trade regime could produce significant gains in social welfare.
Although restricted trade would decrease the availability of
87. See supra note 85.
88. For example, in the illustration in supra note 84, as for the five people for whom
the product was available before the introduction of the import but who now no longer
have access to it, there is a lost surplus from the product not being available at T2 of 11. If
their demand curve were flattened, so that the demand of valuation of the first five was 6,
5 1/2, 5, 4 1/2, and 4, the lost consumer surplus from not producing the good for these five
would have only been 1. Alternatively, assuming an equally flat but higher demand
curve-for example, going down by the same 1/2 point but with the top valuation being 7
and with the fifth person valuing it at 5-the product would be produced but would only
generate a surplus of 6. In either case, with this flatter demand curve, the surplus either
gained or lost would be less than the 11 lost in the original example.
89. When costless, effective price discrimination allows any good that increases
welfare-at least as identified in the current analysis-to be produced. Under these
circumstances, the seller can capture the value placed on the good by the consumer, and
this value will be enough to pay for producing the good.
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marginally successful imports, the net effect could be positive for the
country imposing the rules.
Note that the three conditions-large audience, relatively flat
demand curve, opportunities for price discrimination-are not
independent. Assuming a demand curve with the same shape and
same high and low points, the larger audience simply flattens the
curve.90 Having a larger audience-and, as will be noted below, an
international audience-also increases opportunities to price
discriminate. These three factors support a general expectation that
the media products justified by consumer welfare criteria but
eliminated by market competition will most often be comparatively
unique products desired by smaller subparts of the population.
International free trade predictably exacerbates the problem, most
obviously by increasing the audience size and the capacity to price
discriminate. The consequent inefficiency or market failures can
justify governmental interventions.
Price discrimination merits further discussion. Effective ability
and willingness to price discriminate allows products to be
commercially viable up to the point that they generate no consumer
or producer surplus. Domestically, by using different "windows"-
such as movie theaters, video cassettes, television, pay and free cable,
or an original or spin-off book-a media company can increase its
ability to sell the original product to different people at different
prices. To the extent that the company can market each of these
versions for different prices in different countries, which is the norm,
this multinational reach adds significantly to the number of windows
available.
Using different windows, however, costs money that must be
recovered. The possibility of recovery increases with the size of the
audience over which to spread the overhead cost of creating different
windows. Exporting mass-appeal products, especially blockbusters,
should increase both audience size and the number of windows,
allowing for more effective price discrimination. As price
discrimination increases, the success of these products increases up to
the limit case, where no social surplus, either consumer or producer,
is produced. Specifically, marginally successful export products, that
would fail under even a relatively small trade burden, may exist only
because of international trade's enhancement of their ability to price
discriminate, leading them to produce little welfare gain. Their
success, however, generates an overall welfare loss due to the
90. See supra note 85.
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resulting failure of valued, smaller-audience domestic products that
are less able to price discriminate. That is, the loss from the failure of
domestic products is predictably greater than any gain from
marginally successful imported media products. In such situations,
audiences would benefit if governments could burden these mass-
appeal media exports' competitive opportunities.
In sum, the "non-rivalrous use" attribute of media goods first
explains the competitive success of American media products
internationally. It also provides an efficiency as opposed to a
dumping explanation of the tendency to price U.S. products
differently in different countries. More important for policy
purposes, this attribute explains why economic theory cannot predict
that free trade in these products will be better at giving audiences
what they want than would a well-designed system of trade restraints.
Economic theory even gives some reasons to expect that international
free trade will be inefficient as compared to an optimal system of
restraints from the perspective of both American audiences and
audiences in importing countries.
The most obvious policy response is to subsidize those categories
of media products that are most likely to be economically justified but
that will not survive in a free market. Nevertheless, the United States
has argued that domestic subsidies violate free trade principles.
Equally contrary to a defensible policy regime and possibly even
more insensitive politically, the United States has suggested that
subsidies would be permissible as long as equally available to
American media products.91 The economic justification for subsidies
applies uniquely to local media products disadvantaged by the free
trade regime.
Responsive policies do not necessarily end with subsidies.
Because competition with imports causes the failure of some
domestic products valued by consumers, these consumers could
benefit if those imports that produce the smallest proportionate
surplus per consumer were kept out of their country or if the
importing country could limit the reach of the imports to audiences
91. Although the dominant position of the United States was that European,
especially French, subsidies for domestic films violate the free trade principles that should
be enshrined in the GATT agreement, the United States also apparently suggested that
subsidies would be acceptable if France and other European countries made them
available to American film companies on a non-discriminatory basis. See Aircraft
Subsidies, Audiovisuals Remain Barriers to U.S.-EC Accord, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. Current
Reps. (BNA) No. 48, at 2038 (Dec. 8, 1993); J.E. Ferry, Letter to the Editor, Seeking Same
Subsidies, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20,1993, at 12.
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that valued them comparatively highly. That is, the policy aim should
be to enhance structural rules that eliminate the gain from importing
marginally valued, large-audience products or that at least reduce the
reach of such blockbuster imports.
A country could pursue both pro-audience policies with properly
designed import duties or taxes discriminating against the imports,
especially if the proceeds were then used to subsidize local media
products. In contrast, a flat duty per imported movie or show would
eliminate mostly imports with small, even if rather intensely
interested, audiences-precisely the imports that are most clearly
justified on consumer welfare grounds. Thus, to achieve the desired
effect, the duty or tax ideally should be tied to audience size, for
example, x cents per viewer, rather than being the same for each film,
program, or title.
Some countries mandate "screen quotas," typically requiring
theaters to show domestic films in a certain percentage of their
screenings, or "broadcast time quotas," typically requiring domestic
programming for a certain percentage of the broadcast dayY2 Others
have similar rules requiring a minimum percentage of domestic music
in radio broadcasts.93  These rules also can be beneficial. They
marginally reduce the reach of imports, but, importantly, they do so
without barring any particular import desired by people in the
receiving country. Moreover, by allowing house-packing imports that
help make a theater (or station) profitable, these rules in effect
subsidize screen or air time for local content. While directly aiding
local media products, these quotas still allow importing firms to
determine what combination of blockbuster and more specialized
imports produce the larger capturable surplus. In contrast, quotas on
the number of imported movies or television programs would favor
92. This policy created a major controversy when embodied in a European
Community Directive in 1989. See Donaldson, supra note 15, at 92-93; id. passim.
Countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Mexico, and Spain have adopted
domestic content requirements for broadcast programming. See NEW STRATEGIES, supra
note 40, at 18-19. France, Mexico, and Spain are among those that impose minimum film
screening requirements for domestic films. See id. at 19.
93. Various countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Israel, and South Africa,
impose domestic content requirements on radio broadcasts of popular music. See NEW
STRATEGiES, supra note 40, at 10, 18; Tim Cohen, After Hours-SA Music Goes Number
One with a Rocket-Homegrown Heroes Set to Dominate Their Own Pop Charts for the
First Time in History, Bus. DAY (South Africa), May 14, 1999, Music §, at 1, available in
1999 WL 5794485 (attributing the increased taste for and sales of South African music in
part to the government's 20% domestic content requirement for radio music broadcasts);
Hebrew Melodies, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at A3 (reporting on a new Israeli law
requiring that one out of two songs broadcast over public radio stations be in Hebrew).
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importing only blockbusters even if these blockbusters turn out to
damage local production more and produce less surplus than
importing a larger number of products appealing to smaller
audiences. Therefore, as a policy matter, the screen and time quotas
seem far better. Finally, this public goods argument clearly does not
justify any outright ban on imports in general or a ban on any
category of media content in particular.
Interestingly, this analysis of the economic problems that free
trade creates for potentially more valued local products, when
combined with the policy possibilities for improving on free trade,
suggests that the existing media regulation in democratic regimes in
much of the world-including Europe, Canada, and Israel-make
rough economic, audience-serving sense, while the goals of U.S. trade
policy do not.
B. Externalities
Markets achieve efficient results only when products are sold at
roughly their real cost. Selling at above cost is, for example, the
economic evil most often attributed to monopolists. The harm is that
this price restricts the availability of goods that people want.
Similarly, this concern with proper pricing purportedly justifies free
trade advocates' condemnation of dumping 4 Monopolies and
implicit subsidies are not the only reasons, however, that enterprises
sell products above or below their real cost. Improper pricing also
occurs when products create large negative and positive
"externalities"-that is, harms or benefits to people other than the
owner or purchaser of the product. The product's real cost is the sum
of the cost to the producer plus the cost imposed on third parties.
Proper pricing will include both costs. Moreover, purchasers are not
properly charged for benefits to third parties; the selling price should
be reduced by the amount of these positive externalities.
Nevertheless, because negative externalities are costs not borne by
either the producer or the purchaser, producers of goods with
negative externalities can sell these goods at below their real cost.
Because purchases (demand) usually increase when price goes down,
this improperly low price causes the overproduction of these goods.
The converse is true for goods with positive externalities. Purchasers
94. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. Dumping also can be a means to
get rid of excess inventory or can be distressed pricing to cover short term operating costs
even if too low to also cover fixed costs. Regardless of the motive, this pricing strategy of
the exporter can undermine the economic basis of efficient local industry in the importing
state or in another exporting state.
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pay not only for the value they receive but also for benefits that go to
third parties. This situation makes the cost to purchasers too high,
resulting in too little effective demand and concomitant
underproduction.
Media products generate huge externalities, both positive and
negative. Of course, identification, measurement, and even
characterization of these externalities can be extremely controversial.
If Thomas Paine's Common Sense increased rebelliousness among
colonial readers, was this effect a benefit or harm to nonreaders-
those colonists and British who did not purchase the book? Is a
woman's greater readiness to be assertive after reading feminist
literature a benefit or harm to third parties? What is clear is that by
affecting readers' or viewers' behavior-behavior that in turn affects
other people-media products have positive or negative values for
people other than their buyers and sellers. Of course, specific
behavioral effects of media products are not automatic; typically, they
depend on the particularities of each product's reception.95 Indeed,
the same image or story can be a crucial element in radically different
causal chains. Whether or not likely, a Dostoevsky novel could lead
one reader to commit murder, a second to become a pacifist and
(intelligently) vote socialist, a third to vote Republican, and a fourth
to fall in love. The same diverse possibilities exist for viewers of a
Tarantino film, although the likelihood of each effect would
presumably change. Still, despite difficulties in identification,
measurement, and characterization, some behavioral and, hence,
third-party effects of communication are inevitable. Neither the
educational establishment nor the advertising industry are likely to be
totally wrong! Likewise, even if a person does not directly consume
particular media products, those products can deeply influence the
cultures in which that person negotiates her identity and develops her
ideals. Moreover, in addition to externalities from their consumption,
95. Although negative externalities of other products often give rise to tort liability,
this should not occur with media products for two reasons. First, there is an ethical value
in respecting the autonomy of the listener as well as the speaker. Second, the effects vary
from person to person and are hard to measure objectively. Thus, First Amendment
protection of communications that may cause great harms to the receiver or third parties
with whom the recipient interacts is justified because that level of protection allows for
choice by speakers and respects the autonomy of, rather than paternalistically protecting,
the listener by leaving responsibility for (and choice of) responses to that recipient. That
is, the First Amendment should protect communicative content that has great negative
externalities, even though in non-speech contexts negative externalities often are subject
to tort liability. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
979, 986-93 (1997).
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the production of media products also can have major consequences
not fully captured by the market. Sustained investigative reporting by
a local paper that deters or exposes local corruption can dramatically
affect people in the community other than the paper's readers (and
advertisers).
The market will not properly price and produce a media product
unless, by improbable chance, the product generates roughly equal
negative and positive externalities. Because the externalities can be
huge, public policy cannot sensibly ignore them.96 Nevertheless, to
understate the problem, the first difficulty is that, even if media
externalities are huge, their measurement is virtually impossible.
Still, some relevant generalizations are plausible. Praise by cultural
critics, commentators, or educators for particular media products
(and probably for genres) commonly relates to elements of the
products that not only create appeal to immediate consumers but also
that indirectly benefit third parties-and the converse is true for
criticism by similar observers. Elsewhere I have argued that society
should and does have policies that respond to media products'
externalities, that these policies should and often do promote media
products that have positive externalities rather than the converse, but
that policy measures should not and constitutionally cannot take the
96. But cf Shao, supra note 2, at 141, 146-47 (arguing that the market alone should be
relied upon in the formulation of public policy). Citing STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM 26 (1982), Shao implies that soft variables should be largely ignored for
policy purposes. He argues that "the less susceptible objectives are to monetary
estimation, the less useful externality-type characterizations are to policy formation,"
Shao, supra note 2, at 141, and that the market should be relied upon, especially because
any invocation of such unmeasurable values would violate the critical norm that
governments not act arbitrarily. Contrary to Shao's view, I believe that it is the height of
irrationality to ignore variables that could be the most significant for human welfare
merely because they are not scientifically quantifiable. Ignoring soft variables can simply
lead to dramatically wrong results. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis
or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66 (1972); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think
About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317-
22 (1974). Although Breyer might be interpreted as recommending that policy makers
ignore soft variables, his main point seems different-that in cases in which variables
cannot be quantified monetarily, "one is better off speaking directly of non-economic
reasons for and against taking a particular action." BREYER, supra, at 26. That position is
clearly defensible. Still, my inclination, at least here, is to reject it. Breyer's approach may
be understood to suggest that, on economic grounds, some policy is best while admitting
that there might be other considerations. The argument is pitched as a dispute between
following hard-headed economic grounds and other soft considerations. This description
mischaracterizes the dispute. On the basis of the usual economic concerns-promoting
what people value, using resources efficiently, providing for individual preferences-
economics and the "other" considerations may both argue against the policy. Moreover, a
discursive gain results from recognizing that the honest economic recommendation is
controversial or indeterminate.
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form of censorship.97 These policies correspond to the common sense
view that both individually and collectively we have self-interested
reasons, as well as friendly or paternalistic reasons, to encourage
others to favor some or avoid other media products.
Significant externalities do not automatically justify differential
treatment of foreign and domestic media products. Free trade
principles generally allow restrictions that are uniformly applied to
both.98 Thus, for the existence of externalities to have implications
for trade policy, the externalities of imports would have to differ from
those of the domestic products that the imports would supplement or
replace. Even then, a uniform policy response would often be most
efficacious. Sometimes, however, such differences can provide an
economic reason to deviate from a general free trade regime.
Whether significant differences exist between the externalities of
domestic and imported media products is contextual. Even if,
counterfactuay, under a free trade regime different countries chose
roughly the same (often American) imports, these imports likely
would replace dramatically different types of domestic products; the
97. See Baker, supra note 8, at 346-85, 414-17. Here, I use the term "censorship"
narrowly to refer only to rules or practices that forbid or punish expression criminally or
civilly or that are designed to suppress particular content. Repeated, heated arguments
with legal representatives of the media and civil liberties community have taught me that
some people use the concept of censorship much more broadly-for example, to describe
any policy that has the effect of reducing the availability of some media content. Cf.
Jonathan L. Wolff, Comment, The V-Chip: Giving Parents the Ability to Regulate
Television Violence, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 785, 819 (1997) (claiming that "opponents
of the V-Chip, most of whom are either part of the television industry or television
manufacturing industry, argue that the V-Chip censors one's First Amendment right to
watch whatever one wishes"). That usage, I think, robs the term of its legitimate bite.
Thus, I do not here use "censorship" to include requirements, for example, that a media
producer include information about the product, much as the government requires of drug
manufacturers, if the requirement imposes no direct restrictions on the production or
availability of the media product and is designed to serve a policy other than suppressing
the speech. For constitutional purposes, however, the difficulty is distinguishing between
a governmental purpose to aid the potential consumer, with awareness that the effect may
be to reduce demand for identified content, and a purpose to reduce demand by
manipulating the consumer. Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 478-80 (1987) (upholding
over a strong dissent a requirement that certain foreign films be labeled as "political
propaganda").
98. These principles compare roughly to those of the negative or dormant Commerce
Clause, which constitutionalizes an internal free trade regime in the United States. The
Commerce Clause bars states from overtly discriminating against out-of-state goods or
activities, but leaves states almost totally free to impose restraints, prohibitions, or
burdens on goods or activities, see, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24
(1978), even if the burden falls mostly on out-of-state firms or practices, as long as the law
plausibly serves a local purpose (including non-discriminatory economic purposes) and
does not facially discriminate against outsiders, see, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.,
437 U.S. 117,125-29 (1978).
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displaced products would hardly be the same in Canada or Italy as in
Saudi Arabia or Cuba. 9  Predictions of systematic differences
between the externalities of imported media products and of those
that they replace or supplement will be speculative and, as noted,
evaluative characterizations will inevitably be contested. Under these
circumstances, the question of who should make policy-determinative
judgments becomes central. An obvious reason to exclude cultural
products from free trade agreements is the premise that such
judgments ought to remain a matter of democratic politics. Without
an abstract reason to predict that the externalities of products favored
by an international free trade regime would be the same or better
than those of domestic products, rather than relying blindly on the
market, 100 the more appropriate response is for the parties most
affected to reach a judgment through the only mechanism available to
them to make structural decisions: residents of each country should
express their judgment through their political order.
Beyond this generic argument for leaving the issue to internal
politics, I want to explore whether the externality analysis tilts toward
any substantive policy conclusions. Some characteristic differences
between imports and displaced domestic media products may apply
quite widely. A description could aid a discussion of whether free
trade predictably increases either negative or positive externalities
over an optimal set of trade restrictions.
The comparative success of imports that results from greater
expenditures on merely creating a slicker appeal has in itself no
obvious relation to greater positive or negative externalities. Rather,
the predictable differences in content between imports and exports
are probably most relevant for an externality analysis. As a category,
imports characteristically bring in new and different perspectives.
They can support greater cross-cultural understanding. Additionally,
imported products can bring with them ideas about equality, liberty,
gender roles, environmentalism, democracy, or other "foreign" ideas.
Thus, authoritarian regimes that wish to manipulate their subjects'
views have reason to fear free trade.10 But even if authoritarian or
99. Typical domestic media products vary between countries in many dimensions in
addition to production values and overt political values. For example, Hallin notes that
commercial Mexican television focuses almost exclusively on wealthy characters while
Cuban programs portray everyday lives of ordinary people. See Hallin, supra note 38, at
165. These are quite different contents for an import to displace.
100. See supra note 96.
101. Even a democratic regime that censors certain content, such as pornography, may
find free trade difficult to police, particularly if the products are imported by individual
customers. See Amy Harmon, Internet Sales of Nazi Books in Germany Assailed, N.Y.
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traditional elites reject these outside or dissident ideas, many people
in a society, including those who are not direct consumers of the
media products, would find such content beneficial, and perhaps even
transformative.'02 Economic analysis is an awkward tool with which
to evaluate an externality that is negative for some-for example,
authoritarian elites or traditionalists-but is positive for others. Still,
normative theory symmetrically discredits policy reliance on some
perspectives that identify negative externalities of media products-
for example, the view that counts undermining hierarchical or
undemocratic authority as a negative effect.103 Thus, on the whole,
bringing in new ideas should be considered a major plus of free trade.
Introduction of liberating content is not the only predictable
content difference, however. Other differences relate to imports
having more negative externalities or replacing local media that have
more positive aspects. The earlier discussion suggested that an
export's success often relates to having comparatively high levels of U
(universal) inputs and comparatively less D (domestic) inputs than do
nonexport-oriented products. For the United States, as a major
exporter, this means that free trade should lead internally to more
products with high levels of U and fewer with high levels of D. For
importing countries, the imports with typically high levels of U and
little D to differeing degrees will supplement, marginalize, or replace
domestic products with high levels of D. Of course, the labels
"domestic" and "universal" encompass a vast array of variable
specifics. Still, because even rough characterizations will suggest
policy implications, I offer a few limited hypotheses about each
category.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1999, at C12 (describing Internet customers' access to books that are
banned in the consumers' home country).
102. See, e.g., Larry Gross, Minorities, Majorities and the Media, in MEDIA, RITUAL
AND IDENTITY, supra note 38, at 87, 87-88 (describing the transformative experience of
finding as a youth a book about American gay identity in the Hebrew University library).
103. In its purportedly most "neutral" version, economic analysis counts each person's
preferences, although wealthy people's greater ability to pay causes their preferences to
weigh more heavily, which shows one troublesome ideological feature of typical welfare
economics. The normative reason for valuing economic efficiency or consumer
sovereignty, however, is either the utilitarian goal of satisfying audiences' desires or the
liberal enlightenment principles concerning respect for people's autonomy and equality.
Neither would significantly credit authoritarian elites' interest in maintaining a repressive
status quo. The utilitarian should not overly weight hierarchical elites' views or interests
based on their wealth or power. In a policy context, as opposed to a rights context, the
enlightenment framework should reject any "counting" of preferences that are in
opposition to the "liberal" reasons that justified counting people's interests in the first
place. See C. Edwin Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective Choice Situations, 25
UCLA L. REV. 381,399-413 (1978).
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Universal content tends to avoid cultural complexity and to
exhibit simplicity in discursive structure. As noted earlier, favored
elements are likely to include violence, action, and possibly sex'14 or
romance on the theory that these translate comparatively easily
between cultures. Although the issue is subject to dispute,
overwhelming evidence indicates that some violent media content
generates overtly negative externalities. 05 If, as suggested by many
critiques, it also tends toward cultural shallowness, this could add to
objections.
Possibly more important than an import's universal content is the
domestic content lost to the displacement or marginalization of the
local media products. This loss can have major significance because
media products serve diverse functions for any society or group of
people. The news media, for example, hopefully performs various
vital democratic functions ranging from being a watchdog that
exposes corruption and an information source that informs
democratic decisionmaking to a partisan stimulant for political
participation and a medium for subgroup deliberation. Quality
performance of these functions can have significant positive
externalities. It can dramatically improve the well-being of people
beyond the immediate consumers of the media products. For these
purposes, domestic content is usually crucial.
The relevant concerns about not displacing local media, however,
extend beyond the news and public affairs media. Those concerns
include the quality and content of popular fiction and non-political,
non-fictional materials. Neither individuals, nor groups, nor nations
float free of their contexts. As members of traditions and groups,
individuals need to confront their own historically situated problems
and concerns. In addition to using a local language, domestic-
oriented media products typically either reflect, react against, or
implicitly comment on the world views that dominate within their
own country. Although culture has real value as a museum piece,1' 6
104. Cultural taboos and interpretative practices relating to sex may make this
common assertion problematic. Countries may be clustered in how sexual content is
understood and valued. I make no claims to sort out this issue.
105. See 1 COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE & YOUTH, AMERICAN PSYCHOL. ASS'N,
VIOLENCE AND YOUTH: PSYCHOLOGY'S RESPONSE 32-35 (1993); Committee on
Communications, American Academy of Pediatrics, Media Violence, 95 PEDIATRICS 949,
949-51 (1995); see also JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING VIOLENCE: THE ECONOMIC
MARKET FOR VIOLENT TELEVISION PROGRAMS 20-30 (1998) (reviewing numerous
studies on the effects of violent television programs on individuals).
106. Not only the discursive but also the museum aspects of cultural items can have
significant positive externalities. I certainly do not want to belittle the museum aspect.
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as noted in Part I, cultural materials more importantly provide the
discursive means and medium for individuals and groups to address
issues of identity, values, and motivation. Individuals' success in
addressing these issues can impact profoundly all those with whom
they directly or indirectly interact. Thus, the quality of any
individual's discursive opportunities affects all those with whom she
associates. In sum, to the extent that a country's own media products
better provide (or provide in ways not duplicated by imports)
domestic content that people need directly for their political process
to function or, more generally, for their cultural discourses of identity,
meaning, and value, domestic media can have tremendous positive
externalities not supplied by the imports that threaten to replace the
local content.
These observations on differences between and uses of domestic
and imported media suggest the following propositions. First, the
quality and availability of cultural and other media content influence
the functioning of democracy, the quality of individuals' normative
reflections, and the development and richness of their identities.
Second, what counts as good media content will vary among persons,
among groups, and among nations. Even within a group or nation,
the identification of quality will inevitably be contested. Third,
imported media products can have positive qualities. For instance,
they can introduce new and potentially transformative values,
perspectives, and cultural resources that can be particularly important
for individuals or groups that are oppressed or marginalized by the
dominant local culture." Fourth, imports often embody less
culturally valuable and less culturally specific material. Some
imports-for example, those emphasizing violence-predictably
produce significant negative externalities.108  Of course, domestic
media products can generate negative externalities as well, but, if my
analysis is correct, this result is less common. Fifth, imports often will
People can and do value maintenance of cultural relics-in museums and graveyards-and
are often impassioned about their preservation, even if, as individuals, they do not own
and never visit or "use" the items.
107. See, e.g., Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, The Global and the Local in
International Communications, in MASS MEDIA AND SoCIETY 118, 132-33 (James Curran
& Michael Gurevitch eds., 1991) (describing how a Moroccan woman, in a region where
"public space is male space," defiantly wore a denim skirt and earrings to a traditional
religious feast).
108. Note again the caution that these statements always require. Did violence
arguably inspired by Thomas Paine create negative or positive externalities? Partly
because of the difference among different viewers'/listeners'/readers' reception of media
materials and partly because of the different evaluations of behavior in different contexts
and by different people, the same violent content can have either good or bad effects.
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replace domestic media products that are more oriented toward local
needs. A substantial portion of the value of these lost domestic
products lies in the benefits that non-readers and non-viewers gain
from their availability and consumption by their compatriots. That is,
the displaced media products would have generated large positive
externalities. Finally, although depending on empirical matters such
as the extent and significance of the externalities described in the
third, fourth, and fifth points above, unrestrained trade in media
products is likely to reduce consumer welfare in the importing
country. In other words, implementation of free trade principles
could prevent audiences from getting what they want had products
been priced on the basis of their real costs. If so, welfare-maximizing
results require governmental interventions, including local subsidies
and possibly well-designed trade restraints.
Trade restraints, of course, vary in desirability and legitimacy.
Imports can be liberating and transformative. Restrictions can be
motivated by a desire to maintain systems of domination. On the
other hand, democratic, vibrant societies require domestic media
content. Restraints on imports can protect and promote these
domestic products. Happily, the legitimate and illegitimate interests
to a considerable degree are furthered by different policies such that,
with will and wisdom, a nation can choose only appropriate
restrictions. This difference makes the ideal not free trade, but rather
intelligent interventions. Of course, protection of state sovereignty
guarantees neither the needed will nor the needed wisdom.
Overt exclusions-censorship or blockage of content-based
categories of materials-likely reflect illiberal aims of maintaining
oppressive elements of a country's political or social order.09
However, unless this censorship is imposed on a massive scale,
content-based exclusions are unlikely to do much to protect the local
media's economic base. In contrast, properly designed subsidies can
benefit local media. In addition, taxes or duties that target but only
marginally burden imports (especially if the proceeds are used to
subsidize local media) and devices such as screen or airtime quotas
that are designed to preserve space or markets for domestic products
do not bar any outside content. Not only do quotas serve local
economic interests, but also they often can be justified economically
109. Of course, international law seems to permit, if not require, such censorship of
certain racist material and perhaps other purportedly equality-denying speech, such as
pornography. In this Essay, I take no position on such restraints. But see Baker, supra
note 24, at 1181-1211 (arguing that, properly understood, constitutional notions of both
equality and autonomy reject the suppression of such speech).
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as, in effect, subsidies for local media products that produce positive
externalities."0 The justification for these discriminations against
imports becomes stronger in proportion to the size of the threat to
domestic media.
This difference in justification depending on national
circumstance leads to an interesting asymmetry. A country like the
United States-and, today, possibly only the United States"'-cannot
rely on these externality considerations as a justification for
burdening incoming materials. Where domestic media are not
materially threatened, the main consequence of imports-particularly
imports containing domestic content of the exporting country-is to
increase cultural diversity and to add to discursive possibilities in the
importing country. In contrast, for countries whose domestic media,
or relevant portions of them, are threatened, the economically
justified role of tariffs, discriminatory taxes, or time/screen/place
quotas (but not categorical exclusions of imports), recommends
something close to the existing international trade regime: an
exception for cultural products from international agreements
imposing free trade principles." 2  Rules that reduce imports'
competitive advantage resulting from their ability to spread huge first
copy costs over more customers and to more effectively engage in
price discrimination often will be welfare advancing. Therefore, these
countries should not negotiate away their prerogative to burden or
restrict trade. Countries need this authority to better structure their
media industries and to promote domestic media products."
110. The political support that these laws receive from benefited economic interests
does not discredit the legitimate justifications. Cf Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471 & n.15 (1981) (concluding that, for equal protection and
dormant Commerce Clause purposes, local discriminatory economic benefits raised in the
legislature as a basis for approving a particular law do not undermine legitimate
justifications for the statute based on possible environmental benefits).
111. See supra note 77-78 and accompanying text.
112. This economic analysis might suggest an international trade rule that allows such
restraints only when imports in a particular media category are over some arbitrary
percentage, say 33%. Otherwise, general free trade rules should apply. In the United
States, imports do not come close to reaching this level in any media sector. In other
countries, they often do. For example, in Canada, U.S. magazines have often captured
roughly 80% of the market. See infra note 180. Wildman reported that in eight leading
countries of Western Europe, American films obtained from 92% (United Kingdom) to
45% (France) or 30% (Italy) of the market. See WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 19.
While in the United States only about 2% of television programming is imported, in most
countries more than 25% originates in other countries. See Ud at 42-44. Thus, a rule such
as that suggested above would usually prohibit restrictions in the United States, but allow
them in most other countries.
113. Rather than a broad cultural exemption in international trade agreements, the
developing view in many countries is that a new international instrument is needed that
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C. Non-Market Measures of Preferences
Free trade advocates assume that people's willingness and ability
to pay within a market properly identifies and measures consumer
preferences. Only if this assumption is valid can unimpeded markets
be expected to give people what they want; only then is the consumer
really sovereign. Significantly, however, the market is only one place
where people express preferences. Indeed, people often express
preferences simply by saying they prefer something, and what they
will say they prefer often changes as the context changes. Indeed,
people often express preferences in discussion, and such preferences
often change as the context or the nature of the discussion changes.
People also express preferences by choosing to spend time engaging
in one activity rather than another. Moreover, the market's
willingness and ability to pay standard is merely one way to measure
preferences. Other methods of identifying and measuring
preferences are possible. A system could refuse to credit any
expression that does not survive discussion and reflection. Another
system might weight preferences on the basis of how much a person
would be willing to pay under circumstances in which everyone begins
with equal wealth. Both these systems would allow the person to be
sovereign, counting only her expressions of preferences. They both
offer a method of identifying and, at least in the second system,
measuring preferences, but both would get results different from the
market's.
No neutral or logical principle indicates that one or another
measure is more accurate, legitimate, or "real." The determination of
which measure to credit depends on the purpose of the measurement
and, possibly, on a conception of what personal qualities to treat as
most significant. Presumably, the measure that a society would want
to credit will vary depending on the issue or context. With this in
mind, I will consider three types of possible objections to reliance on
market measurement and the relevance of these objections for
international trade in media products: (1) market measures are
misguided because they are too commodified;" 4 (2) relatedly, market
affirmatively speaks to countries' right to develop without retaliation their own cultural
policies, including trade restrictions. See, e.g., NEW STRATEGIES, supra note 40, at 30-32;
see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 34, at 16 (statements of the Italian and South African
Ministers). Nothing in my analysis speaks to which route is preferable.
114. The mere use of economic terms such as externalities to discuss the issues raised
in this Essay can be criticized as contributing to improper commodification. See
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 174-76, 178, 180-83 (1996)
(evaluating this criticism). Certainly, particular languages are out of place in particular
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measures only identify expressions made in one context and that
context should not be privileged; and (3) the market's criterion-
willingness and ability to pay-is inappropriate largely because it is
insufficiently egalitarian.
1. Commodification
People may lose something of great value when entertainment
and culture become "too" commodified. George Gerbner regularly
observes that the age of commercial television is the first time in
human history that children have learned about themselves and the
world primarily by listening to corporations with something to sell
rather than to people with something to tell." 5 Family storytelling
and a town's participatory ritual celebrations or reenactments differ
from their commercialized counterparts. The differences are three-
fold. First, opportunities for the practices are distributed differently.
Second, their overt content is likely to differ for various reasons.
Third, even if the overt content remains the same, the experience of
receiving (and providing) the content can differ dramatically. A story
or drama told or enacted by a friend or family member, like a plate
won in a competition or a bottle of wine received as a gift, has a
different significance than if purchased from a seller.
Commodification changes, and sometimes worsens, the experience of
receiving access to culture and entertainment.
The above points about the value of and people's desires for
non-commodified practices should be obvious. Less obvious is why it
matters for policy purposes. The question is: why not merely allow
people to choose? According to one view, people can seek out
whichever type of entertainment they prefer whenever they want.
Sometimes they prefer commodified cultural content, and sometimes
they prefer non-commodified cultural content. Of course,
commodified and non-commodified cultural options often compete
for people's time and resources. When commodified forms become
contexts. Still, any language can be explored, as this Essay is doing with economics, to see
if it provides insight on an issue. No single language can do all that others do, but a given
insight is seldom (if ever) available in only one language. The danger of hegemony arises
when a particular language either implicitly or explicitly claims to be the only way to reach
insight. In contrast, to use a language for purposes of internal critique, to show that it does
not lead to conclusions in which its "native" speakers dominantly believe, can be
particularly instructive. That ambition motivates this Essay.
115. This theme is one that I have constantly heard George Gerbner, former Dean of
the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania, invoke over
the last six years at meetings of the Cultural Environment Movement, which he founded in
the early 1990s, and at other conferences of communications scholars and activists.
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cheaper, they will be chosen more often. But that is not a reason to
object. Indeed, this scenario presumably sees more preferences
satisfied. Even though non-commodification is often valued, its value
does not provide a basis for systemic critique of market practices
because the two can co-exist and because people's choices will lead to
an optimal mix. Just as history has shown in relation to sex, neither
commodified nor non-commodified entertainment or discourse is
likely to disappear. On this voluntarist view, commodification
sometimes may be unwanted, but this fact is irrelevant for policy
purposes. Nevertheless, I will consider three possible responses to
this view and the possible relevance of each to the international trade
issue.
First, sometimes allowing unrestricted choice can create a
domino effect in the movement toward particular results. For
instance, a particular choice can be so contagious that a few people's
choice in one direction makes other people's contrary choices
irrelevant, or at least places great pressure on others to make the
same choice. 16 Likewise, the choice of one or a few hunters to shoot
at an animal that is a member of an endangered species can eviscerate
the effectiveness of the choice of all others to preserve the species by
refraining from shooting. The same might be true if one person sets
off a backyard nuclear weapon while everyone else in the community
chooses not to do so. Nevertheless, culture generally does not work
that way. It generally reflects the summation of each person's
choices." 7  Without implausible assumptions about a universal
tendency for imitative commodification, the fact that one person
seeks or consumes commodified culture does not require and maybe
does not even create significant pressure for others to do so.1 ' Thus,
116. See RADIN, supra note 114, at 95-103; see also Baker, supra note 103, at 404-08
(describing how some choices affect the world in an "additive" manner and others in a
"determinative" manner and arguing that there is greater justification for collective
control over the latter).
117. This claim may reflect only one possible way of characterizing or seeing the world.
If my preference is for less commercialization of sex (or less homosexual sex), then each
person's choice adds to or detracts from this result. If my preference, however, is to live in
a world where prostitution or homosexual conduct never occur, one person's practice can
determine the world in an objectionable way. Thus, a more normative argument is
required to show why the first, "liberal" way of seeing the world should prevail, at least in
policy contexts.
118. Radin presents the "domino" theory and then rejects at least the extreme version.
See RADIN, supra note 114, at 98. She argues that the assumption that once some people
commodify, everyone will be drawn to that practice, assumes a "natural" tendency to
commodify, a "debatable ideological postulate.., that utopian noncommodifiers can[not]
afford to endorse." Id at 97.
A natural tendency does not have to be relied upon, however, if an initial choice is
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at least in the extreme form, this domino-effect argument should be
rejected.
Once it is granted that both commodified and non-commodified
media and cultural experiences have value, the issue becomes how to
obtain the right quantity of each. This question leads to the second
and third responses to the voluntarist critique of policy interventions.
Legal rules inevitably shape choice without determining it. For
example, generally, the greater the scope of copyright law, the more
the opportunities for commodified versions of communications
expand and the more opportunities for non-commodified versions
contract. If, at the extreme, all words were copyrighted and there
were no fair use rights, no non-commodified conversation could
occur."9 This example illustrates that legal rules always provide part
of the background framework within which people make individual
choices, especially market choices. Given these facts, no references
to what individuals choose under a particular market regime can show
the extent to which people prefer commodified or non-commodified
communications or culture. Rather, actual individual choices merely
show what people prefer given the rules in place. With different
background rules, their choices-their apparent preferences-would
be different. The market itself cannot make the choice between legal
regimes. Rather, it inevitably relies on prior legal choices made and
enforced by the political order or on prior customary practices
effectively enforced within the social order. Thus, the only obvious
evidence of the extent of people's preferences for non-commodified
structurally enforced on others rather than being a matter of their comparatively free
choice. When a person relies on market sales for her livelihood, she must replace the
resources used to produce the items she sells. If she is unable to sell at a price at least
equal to the replacement cost, she loses her livelihood and goes bankrupt. This incapacity
occurs if others with whom she competes sell at a price lower than her replacement cost;
the others could do this if they introduced a more efficient (cheaper) way to produce while
the first person continued to employ the old method. In these circumstances, the first
person is structurally compelled to imitate the new efficient practice. Here, markets
enforce domino effects in the direction of efficient practices-a point relied on by grand
theorists ranging from Marx to Weber and implicit in conservative defenses of the market.
See C. EDwIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 198-206 (1989);
C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALIsM 48, 51-68
(1962). Much earlier in The Prince, written in 1513, Niccoli Machiavelli made a similar
point about political power in explaining why the Prince had to adopt behavior not
generally praised by the ethicist. Unless the Prince acts in the most effective strategic
manner, he will lose out to one who does. Radin, however, seems right about consumer
choices unless the mere existence of commodified goods necessarily comes with a
structure that compels people to seek or use only the commodified version and not the
non-commodified alternatives, a scenario that seems unlikely.
119. See Henry Beard, Editorial, English: The Hostile Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2000, at A27 (imagining precisely such a development).
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goods comes from their collective decisionmaking, most obviously
discursive political choices, that registers these preferences as shown
by adopting legal frameworks that do or do not facilitate non-
commodified options.
Thus, the second response to the voluntarist view is that various
legal rules inevitably tilt choices between commodified and non-
commodified media. The market, however, cannot be used to
resolve the question of which tilt best gives people what they want.
This point has considerable significance in some contexts, as the
copyright illustration suggests. Nevertheless, I do not see how it is at
issue in the dispute about international free trade in media products.
Granted, rules allowing trade will make some commodified products
more cheaply available. This availability, then, can be expected to
increase choices for the commodified option. Free trade, however,
does not seem to raise the cost or difficulty for consumers of choosing
the non-commodified option, which was a problem in the copyright
example. As long as it does not, there seems to be little basis to
criticize the increased choice that free trade makes available. 2'
Third, one particular feature of non-commodification makes it
relevant for media policy. The meaning of non-commodification lies
in part precisely in the goods or activities not being allocated by or
overtly participating in the market. For some activities, storytelling
within the home for example, people may simply make individual
choices about time and other individualized resources (assuming
storytelling, non-commodified theatrical performances, or singing
does not violate copyright or some similar rule). By comparison,
other participatory and non-participatory non-commodified cultural
activities such as public broadcasting, storytelling as a community
activity in a public facility, free public concerts in the park, and public
access to video production and broadcasts over cable channels, all
depend upon collective allocations of resources. Collective action
120. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 passim (1999);
Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law 88-
91 (Mar. 2,2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
121. It should be emphasized that this only relates to a comparison between
commodified and non-commodified options on the basis of whether the background rules
improperly tilt the choice away from people's preferences. As Part I shows, free trade can
have an objectionable effect of reducing choice by effectively increasing the price and
reducing the availability of domestic commodified media products; and, as Part II
suggests, if non-commodified choices have more positive externalities or if commodified
choices have more negative externalities, then an objection to the pricing implicit within a
free regime could be made.
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and free-rider problems, as well as distributive issues that will be
considered later, operate to prevent gifts or other voluntary non-
market allocations from making these non-commodified activities
available in the amount that individual preferences would wish. Only
collective, usually governmental processes can register and respond
properly to these preferences.'2 These observations, however,
support an argument for subsidies of non-commodified
communications, not for trade restrictions.
In sum, the market is unable to register preferences adequately
for non-commodified media or culture. Preferences for these goods
may be great and socially significant. They may justify various
structural and intellectual property rules. Nevertheless, this aspect of
the market's failure to give people the media they want may have
little apparent bearing on trade policy. Only if trade policy decreases
the availability of non-commodified behavior-tilting against non-
market choices the way copyright law can-or if trade law encumbers
the subsidization of non-commodified media would this failure be
relevant here.
2. Preference Identification
Markets measure preferences only when a person is willing and
able to make a purchase. Such purchases, however, are not the only
times or the only ways in which people express preferences. As noted
above, some preferences will be inconsistent with this manner of
expression. This inconsistency will occur, for example, if the
preference is for a non-commodified good. A related but separate
observation is that a person will express different preferences in
different contexts: a person expresses a preference in the ballot
booth, in conversation after reflection, or by giving a list to Santa
Claus. These expressions will not always be consistent. Both the
ranking and intensity of preferences for the same items often are not
the same across modes of expression. A person may rank three
equally expensive goods in one order as shown by her market
behavior, in another after discussion if not required to publicly
disclose those views, and in a third order if she must express the
rankings publicly. A person might choose differently if she now
chooses something that she will do or receive in the future than she
122. Ullamaija Kivikuru makes the empirical claim that non-commodified forms are
both more common and more empowering under conditions of scarcity of commodified
media. See Ullamaija Kivikuru, Peripheral Mass Communication: Rich in Contradictions,
in BEYOND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 145, 149-55 (Kaarle Nordenstreng & Herbert I.
Schiller eds., 1993).
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would if the decision were based on her preferences at that future
time. For instance, a person may express one preference in making a
New Year's resolution and indicate a different one the next day when
she breaks the resolution. That is, her preference may change either
with time or with a change in context.'13 None of these expressions
need be dishonest or inaccurate. They differ because the person
considers different matters in each context. But none of those
matters is unreal. A person rationally could identify more with, wish
more for the opportunity to make, or otherwise want to privilege one
or another of these expressions. Moreover, her choice about which
type of expression with which to identify will often depend on the
issue or context.
Most societies honor different expressions of preferences
depending on the issue or context. Sometimes, choices must be
expressed publicly: a defendant must plead in open court as to the
charges brought against her, and often a member of a deliberative
body must publicly express her vote. At other times, society counts
only choices that are expressed anonymously or secretly, as in many
balloting systems. Some expressions of preferences can become
binding on the basis of impulse, as is usually the case with market
decisions. Alternatively, sometimes reflection is structurally favored.
For instance, either to reduce the influence of sellers on buyers or
possibly to promote reflection and deliberation, the law makes some
purchase decisions revocable for a period of time, privileging later
over earlier expressions. Promoting reflection and deliberation is at
least the purported reason to require waiting periods, spousal or
parental notification, or mandatory exposure to certain information
before getting an abortion.1 4  The legal order counts other
expressions of preferences-for example, the waiver of certain
123. Laurence Tribe famously noted that some pigeons would peck a button to force a
delay in obtaining food if the delay would allow them to get more food over the long term,
but that without the button the pigeons would choose to obtain the smaller amount now.
People are more advanced than pigeons in that they can create such forced-delay buttons,
which provides one interpretation of the role of the Constitution. Still, there is no obvious
reason why something people would impulsively want in the future is worse than what
they now calmly think they should receive in the future. Until additional premises show
which expression should be favored, they are just different choices at different times in
different contexts. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22-24
(3d ed. 2000).
124. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). The joint opinion's constitutional critique of these
requirements did not object to these goals, but rather questioned whether these reasons
were the real ones motivating the requirements and whether they actually advanced the
goals. See id. at 878-79 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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constitutional fights-only if the person is adequately informed or
receives the advice of a professional whose training and ethics forbid
allowing her own market gain or personal interests from skewing her
guidance.
The question whether the market under a free trade regime
identifies people's preferences for media products better than does a
political system responsive to public input has no objectively right
answer. It is not merely that the two institutions aggregate individual
preferences differently. Rather, they respond to different
expressions. Of course, political mechanisms may be especially prone
to ossification, may sometimes ignore subgroup interests, and are
subject to corruption and ideological distortion, although these last
two are also true of market systems. On the other hand, political
mechanisms may promote more or better reflection about some
preferences relating to media needs. For example, they may promote
more reflection on choices between more or less commodified media.
Moreover, they may be more open than market actors to subgroup
input both about the subgroup's needs and its view of societal needs.
The Federal Communications Commission, for example, may
respond better than the market to the needs and views of minority
groups. Furthermore, political mechanisms are obviously structurally
better equipped to be responsive to preferences for non-commodified
media.
Thus, both market and non-market mechanisms for registering
and responding to preferences have advantages and disadvantages.
Reliance on a combination makes pragmatic sense, and both are
always used. Ultimately, however, the decision about the mixture of
the two cannot be made by the market. Only legally effective
political decisions can determine the role of each. Fear of
majoritarian or elite oppression provides an important constitutional
reason not to suppress market mechanisms. The law, however,
inevitably structures these mechanisms, thereby affecting how the
market responds to preferences. The structuring is best if done self-
consciously with the aim of producing more responsiveness and more
desirable content. The more that media consumption relates to
identity formation, education, or aiding discursive activities involving
public opinion, the more the choice among media products resembles
decisions that societies often try to partially insulate from market
processes. These factors suggest the propriety of at least some
reliance on non-market expressions of preferences for media content.
The extent to which society chooses to privilege non-market
expressions of preferences - especially preferences identified through
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political mechanisms-is the extent to which it rejects the assumption
that even an ideal free trade regime properly or adequately identifies
and measures preferences. This better-responsiveness justification,
however, does not justify suppression or censorship of content
provided by a market. Although some tax impositions or other
restrictions may play a legitimate role in promoting valued content-
domestic content for example-any attempt merely to keep out
foreign content could hardly be justified by (partially) relying on non-
market means of identifying preferences.
3. Measurement
Possibly the most serious objection to exclusive reliance on the
market involves the criterion it uses to measure or weigh preferences.
As noted, the market counts preferences only if backed by willingness
and ability to pay, but other criteria are possible. This market
criterion counts preferences of the wealthy more than those of the
poor. Nothing about the liberal idea of respecting or satisfying
people's preferences implies the propriety of this weighting. No
premise that the economy ought to satisfy people's preferences
requires the conclusion, implied by the market criterion of "willing
and able to pay," that a rich person's $240 French dinner (with a
"good" wine) necessarily fulfills three times as many preferences as a
poor family's $80 spent on food staples intended to last for over a
week. Of course, economists do not make this claim. They seldom
attempt interpersonal comparisons, there being no logically or
objectively correct way to compare different people's preferences.
Still, any claim that the market gives people what they want implicitly
accepts the criterion of money for making comparisons. 125 For
practical and normative reasons, society often uses the medium of
money to determine who gets what. But this mechanism is no more a
correct measure of weighting preferences than is subjective
evaluation. There is no reason to believe that the market criterion
best provides for fulfilling preferences-for giving people what they
want. Once this fallacy is recognized, other possibilities open up.
Indeed, all democratic societies reject the market criterion in many
contexts.
125. Of course, when being careful, economists do not claim that the perfectly working
market fulfills the most preferences; they do not claim that it maximizes "utility." Rather,
their claim is that the market maximizes fulfillment of preferences "given the existing
distribution of wealth," or they avoid interpersonal comparisons by only claiming that the
perfectly working market creates a "pareto optimal" result, not that it best or maximally
satisfies preferences. See infra note 152.
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Most modem democracies try to operate on a more egalitarian
basis by providing for people's desires for voting rights, basic
education, and police protection. Many countries guarantee access to
basic levels of food, shelter, and medical care as well as access to
some parks, public spaces, and cultural opportunities. In the case of
media content, most democracies use a combination of market and
non-market devices. Historically, some government publications and,
probably most importantly, public libraries have served as means of
providing media content beyond what people receive through the
market. More recently, public broadcasting has played the same role.
This combination of market and non-market provision makes sense.
A market measure of preferences might be perfectly appropriate for
media content that primarily serves an entertainment function.26
And there is no legitimate reason to prevent people from receiving
media products that the market will provide. On the other hand,
remember that the vote and education are purportedly distributed in
a more egalitarian fashion. A democracy could rationally conclude
that media content that is crucial to people's democratic participation
or their continued education ought to be provided on an egalitarian
basis. Likewise, access to culturally important media arguably should
not depend solely on ability to pay.lv7
If availability is to be based on egalitarian premises, then the
problem becomes one of describing the egalitarian standard.
Assuming, as seems likely, that different groups have preferences for
different media products, the question is: what policies provide for all
people equally? This question is deceptively difficult. By
comparison, equality for voters was easy: each person has a right to
vote in equal population districts."m And in education, equality could
126. There remain the problems not with the willingness and ability to pay standard,
but with the market functioning described earlier that independently justify public
provision.
127. Of course, even if in principle they are different, distinguishing between
educational, political, and cultural media on the one hand and entertainment media on the
other creates difficult, possibly insurmountable, line-drawing problems. See Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 158-59 (1946) (refusing to allow the U.S. Post Office to enforce
content distinctions among magazines applying for second-class postal rates).
128. The simplicity as to voting may seem superficial. In addition to the number of
voters in the district, the effectiveness of a person's vote depends on the relation of (1) the
voter's specific political orientation to (2) the political orientation of other people within
her district. Because districts vary in political and demographic composition, the second
part of the relationship means that the effectiveness of a person's vote always will depend
on how the district lines have been drawn. Moreover, the first part of the relationship
means that even within a single district different people will experience the effectiveness
of their vote differently. For example, a person on the far left or right may want a strong
majority for her party so that she can influence who in the party gets the "safe" seat. In
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mean roughly equal per-student expenditures. 9 Following these
examples, strict equality in the media context could mean that each
person has a right to the same amount to spend on the media
products that she prefers or, at least, the egalitarian goal might be
that society move closer to such an allocation.
The economics of public goods, however, complicates the
analysis of equality. The more that consumption of a good is non-
rivalrous, the more the good's availability to a person will depend on
not just her expenditure but the aggregate expenditures of all those
who want it. For media goods, the lower the copy costs are as
compared to the first copy costs, the more each person who wants the
good will benefit from others' expenditures on the media good. For
example, if copy costs are zero, if each person gets to spend one
dollar, and if each of one thousand people uses her dollar to buy the
results of an investigative journalism effort, then each person can
receive a thousand-dollar investigative report for her dollar. But if
only ten people want that investigative journalism, then each can
expect only a ten-dollar product. That is, a person in the mainstream
sends a dollar and gets a thousand dollar media product while the
person closer to the margin gets a ten dollar product for her one
dollar expenditure. Clearly, equal individual amounts to spend on
non-rivalrous goods, which includes most media products, provides
much better media products for a person in the broad mainstream.
"Culture" and news are provided more lavishly for such a person than
for others. This inequality, of course, embodies one possible view of
equality: each person gets an equal amount to spend, and the
contrast, a moderate person may have a more effective voice if the parties are roughly
equal so that the candidates of both parties race toward the middle and try hard to appeal
to her views to get her vote, a situation that denies any effectiveness to the far right or left.
Thus, a one-person-one-vote system can not provide voters with the "equally effective
voice" that the Court says the Constitution demands. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565
(1964). In fact, nothing but proportional representation could come close to satisfying this
so-called constitutional mandate. Still, one-person-one-vote does provide formal equality,
which is the minimum equality that the Constitution properly requires. See C. Edwin
Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58
TEX. L. RaV. 1029,1072-84 (1980).
129. Of course, a different result would be required if the egalitarian goal was either to
equalize educational outcomes or to provide opportunities equally proportionate to a
person's capabilities because such goals would require per-person expenditures to vary.
Likewise, the sometimes-proposed goal of equalizing the capacity of each school district to
spend on education, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 10 (1973),
could drastically deny individual equality by sacrificing some children's educations
because of the anti-public education views of their neighbors. The failure to specify what
theory of equality was being asserted by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez may have led the
Court to be wary of providing relief.
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standard is equal per-person "inputs."
Alternatively, the egalitarian premise could be that each person
has a right to have the same amount spent on the media products that
she desires. That is, each person legitimately has an equal interest in
a system that satisfies her cultural or media needs. Under this second
interpretation, equality exists when each person gets media products
that she wants on which the same amount has been spent; the
standard is an equal "output." The first interpretation is analogous
to, or a contestable version of, equality of opportunity, while the
second suggests equality in results. The difference is between each
person getting the same amount to spend and each person getting the
same amount spent on her preferred media. °30 The second is a more
radical standard. Imagine, for example, if society spent the same
amount on creating products oriented toward the political or cultural
concerns of gay and lesbian people and of heterosexual people, such
that these cultural needs of homosexuals were provided for to the
same extent as those of heterosexuals. The first interpretation of
equality privileges the mainstream; the second does not. Which is
better?
Will Kymlicka argues that individuals typically require a
relatively stable cultural context for identity formation and for
maintenance of self-respect and self-confidence. As an empirical
matter, people's capacity for effective choice and their ability to find
meaningful life options normally depend on membership in a cultural
community with a cultural heritage; coercive assimilation can have
literally deadly results, leading to suicide and destroying people's very
sense of agency.131  Cultural structure is a vital context of choice.
Given the above observations, Kymlicka then draws on John Rawls's
"claim[ that we should have the social conditions needed to
intelligently decide for ourselves what is valuable."132 Because people
cannot intelligently examine and choose options except from within
"a rich and secure cultural structure," the Rawlsian liberal "should be
concerned with the fate of cultural structures.' 1 33 Rawls reasons that
130. As to some goods, equality is more concerned with equality in outcomes, or what
people get, than with equality in expenditures. Few people argue that everyone should
have the same amount spent on their health care. Equality here involves something more
like everyone being cared for to a roughly equal degree when they are in need.
Alternatively, maybe the claim is not that they should have the same amount spent on
their health needs, but that they should get the same amount to spend on health insurance,
possibly with the caveat that health insurance should not be risk-adjusted.
131. See KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 174-76.
132. Id at 164.
133. IM at 165. For similar reasons, JArgen Habermas argues that "[a] correctly
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"'parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any
cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect,' "134 and
Kymlicka observes that "the loss of cultural membership is one such
condition." 35 For these reasons, liberals such as Raws should see
membership in a viable community with its own cultural heritage as a
"primary good" concerning which inequalities are a matter of
injustice.136 Cultural heritage's value as a primary good lies "in its
capacity of providing meaningful options for us, and aiding our ability
to judge for ourselves the value of our life-plans."'37  For these
reasons, cultural communities have crucial importance. The
relevance of this observation is, of course, hardly limited to
Rawlsians. For example, these considerations led Jtirgen Habermas
to conclude that a liberal version of the system of rights must ensure
"strict equal treatment, directed by the citizens themselves, of the life
contexts that safeguard their identities.' 38
Treating cultural structures as Rawlsian primary goods suggests
that justice requires that they be distributed equally unless inequality
benefits the worst off. But this equality cannot mean merely making
a single dominant culture equally available to anyone who wants to
join. Such an interpretation would "misconstrue the universalism of
basic rights as an abstract leveling of distinctions.' 1 39  Empirically,
most people find that their own background culture provides the
context for their subsequent choices,'" even if those choices
sometimes deviate from aspects of the person's cultural tradition-
understood theory of [individualistically designed] rights requires ... [protection of] the
life contexts in which [an individual's] identity is formed." JOROEN HABERMAS, THE
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 208 (1998); see also id at 220-21 (discussing the integrity of an
individual's identity in a multicultural society).
134. KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 166 (quoting JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JuSTICE
440 (1971)).
135. Id
136. Id. at 169, 177.
137. hi. at 166.
138. HABERMAS, supra note 133, at 210 (emphasis added).
139. Id Habermas's point tracks the common feminist critique of the inadequate
notion of equality that merely means equal opportunities for both men and women to
assimilate to the dominant male norm. See id at 209-11.
140. Kymlicka argues that the liberal project crucially depends on the distinction
between "context" and "choice." KYMLiCKA, supra note 19, at 186. A person has no
complaint if her own choices frustrate her life plan, but does have a complaint if she, more
than others, is disadvantaged by context. Thus, liberal theorists properly favor
compensating for disadvantages that are not "chosen," but rather reflect context-for
example, a person's social environment or natural endowments. See supra note 130
(discussing medical care). Likewise, the legal order treats people unequally if it
disadvantages them because of their cultural heritage, for example, by not providing equal
support for that heritage. See KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 186-90.
2000] 1413
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
choices which, when added to the choices of others, will change that
tradition. Because a cultural structure, not income, is the Rawlsian
"primary good" here, equality in relation to this primary good
requires something closer to equal amounts spent on one's culture,
which is the notion of outcome equality. Obviously, satisfying
preferences for cultural goods, when weighted in this egalitarian
manner, requires drastic deviations from market allocations.
Crediting any criterion for measuring preferences or for
allocating resources that is more egalitarian than the willingness and
ability to pay standard has implications for a just trade policy. First, a
more egalitarian weighting obviously requires subsidies for those
educational, cultural, or politically salient media products targeted at
and desired by the poor. Given ubiquitous claims that tariff
reductions make (some) media products more available to the poor,
such an egalitarian standard might favor freer trade. On the other
hand, if domestic media products predictably contain higher portions
of politically and educationally salient or culturally meaningful
content than imports, which may predominantly offer
entertainment,14 1 a country might better satisfy preferences of the
poor for these goods by adopting trade rules that improve the
domestic media's competitive position. And, of course, it also might
need to make subsidies available but presumably only for domestic
media. 42
The view of cultural communities as "primary goods" justifies
making egalitarian claims on their behalf. Kymlicka made this
argument in the context of defending minority rights within a single
141. Wildman and Siwek suggest that copyright law has been responsive to developing
countries' needs relating to materials relevant for educational development purposes. See
WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 143. However, the primary effort in this respect, the
proposed 1976 Stockholm Protocol Regarding Developing Nations, which included low
cost compulsory licenses in appropriate cases, was rejected after opposition by many
industrialized nations. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 593-623 (1987); Sunny
Handa, A Review of Canada's International Copyright Obligations, 42 McGILL L.J. 961,
966-67 (1997); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 235, 277-78 (1998). Netanel persuasively argues
that developing countries' democratic and educational needs require currently unlikely
modifications of the existing international copyright regime. See Netanel, supra, at 327-
28.
142. Ignoring First Amendment norms that they otherwise like to invoke, some free
trade advocates argue that subsidies should focus on content and should be available
equally to domestic and foreign producers. In contrast to this recommendation, the
proposed structural rule not only is reasonably responsive to the concern justifying
subsidies, but also is so without creating the evils of partisan ideological manipulation by
dominate elites or government bureaucrats facilitated by content discrimination.
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country. Each cultural subgroup has an interest in media content that
is especially salient to its own heritage, identity, and politics.
Kymlicka's claim, however, is equally relevant in the international
trade context. This egalitarian weighting, that is, the concern to
support all cultures, justifies trade restrictions on products from those
countries with comparative advantages in order to support local
production of media goods specially designed for comparatively
smaller cultural markets. Thus, for most countries of the world,
particularly countries that are net media importers, the competitive
damage done to domestic media by the influx of imports, primarily
from the United States," suggests the legitimacy of some
restrictions.
The nature of appropriate trade restrictions is another matter.
Kymlicka based the liberal argument for minority rights on the value
of such cultural communities as contexts for choice, not their value as
particular historical cultural content.' 4 He thematizes what I call a
"discourse," not a "museum," conception of culture. 4 The idea of
culture as discourse emphasizes change as well as continuity. No
143. According to a statistical report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, of the 14 countries listed, only the United States and Britain
consistently had positive nets for film export/import income, see OECD, supra note 6, at
108-10, tbl. A.21, and Britain has since become a net importer of television and film
programming, see Chris Barrie, World Faces British TV Onslaught, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 21,1999, at 22. Using 1984 UNESCO data covering 92 countries, Wildman
and Siwek report that the United States was the top supplier of imported films in 56
countries, followed by the USSR as top supplier in 10 countries and India as the top
supplier in 6 countries. See WILDMAN & SBVEK, supra note 6, at 16.
It should be noted that reports of data on revenue from film and related export
income give quite varying numbers. The OECD report lists the United States in 1993 as
having received $1.742 billion in export earning for film rentals and having paid $83
million (the most since 1984) for imports. See OECD, supra note 6, at 108, tbl. A.21.
These export figures may be low, however. Screen International, a London-based
organization, reported U.S. movie exports to Europe in 1995 of more than $5 billion, and
the Los Angeles Times concluded that American world wide entertainment exports
topped $10 billion that year. See James Flanigan, Today's Trade Figures Don't Tell Story
of Future, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1996, at D1. Looking at 1984, the OECD report lists the
U.S. export earnings for film rentals as $519 million. See OECD, supra note 6, at 108, tbl.
A.21. For 1984, Wildman and Siwek, relying on different sources, report total revenue for
the U.S. motion picture industry in foreign markets as $1.685 billion, of which $1.1 billion
was from theater rentals. See WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 31. Using a different
source, Wildman and Siwek report export rental revenue of the major U.S. film
distributors in 1984 as $654 million. See iL at 32.
144. See KYMLICKA, supra note 19, at 168-69, 196-97. Habermas emphasizes the same
point. Calling for cultures to become "reflexive," he strenuously rejects "preservation of
species by administrative means," observing that "to guarantee survival [of a cultural
heritage] would necessarily rob the members of the freedom to say yes or no."
HABERMAS, supra note 133, at 222.
145. See generally supra Part I (discussing the cultural side of the free trade debate).
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cultural group or nation-state can rightfully impose a particular
historical form of its culture on its members. Members always contest
interpretations of their culture. Moreover, culture is always subject to
change by the cultural community's members. This cultural change is
unavoidable, continual, and proper. Therefore, the liberal must reject
the futile attempt to protect any particular historical community from
challenge and change. Just as for Kymlicka protection from change
did not provide an appropriate way to protect minority rights, such
preservation does not provide a legitimate basis for restricting
imports.
The cultural claim must be that a net media importing
community, whether a minority within a nation or a smaller or poorer
country within the international arena, has an interest in assuring the
vibrancy of its own culture as a context of choice. Its culture should
receive adequate nourishment and must not be swamped by outside
forces. Given the huge comparative market advantage that the public
good aspect of media products gives dominant (primarily U.S.) media
products, both the need for nourishment and the danger of being
swamped are real. In addition to domestic subsidies, coherent ways
to respond to these concerns include duties, discriminatory taxes, and
quotas that mandate a minimum percentage of film screenings or
television time be devoted to domestic media. On the other hand,
censorship is improper. It seems aimed only at restricting local choice
and preserving past cultural and political settlements. Of course,
censorship can take various forms. Prohibitions on imports or on
imports with particular content are obvious examples. In addition,
quotas that limit the absolute number of outside (American) films or
television programs that can be imported would be perverse. Such a
rule would merely add to the tendency of blockbuster products to
dominate.
D. Methodological Comment on the Economic Literature
Economic analyses do not confront directly the most important
problems facing the legal order today-problems that involve
questions of value, meaning, collective self-definition, subgroup
rights, intergroup understanding, and hearing and responding to
differences. These larger issues are matters of interpretation,
identity, ethics, and morals, not of efficiency. Their exploration
requires other methodologies. Of course, economic analysis has
valuable uses. When used, however, its partisan premises should not
be ignored, and its inquiry should not be cut short.
This Essay concludes that economic analysis shows that
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unrestricted free trade in media products is likely to hurt audiences,
especially, but not exclusively, audiences outside the United States-
although both empirical and value issues mean that this theoretical
conclusion cannot be taken as certain. Given that economic
argument fills the American legal literature on international trade in
media products, the relative absence of similar conclusions is curious.
What explains the absence? One answer is that my conclusion is
wrong. Another is that treatments in this literature often represent
bad economics.146 But some treatments are quite good,147 so why does
my analysis come out so differently? Although speculative, I want to
offer a hypothesis.
Commercial interests, in addition to muddling through by using
trial and error combined with intuition,14' often utilize intelligent
economic analysis to help determine how to become more profitable.
In addition, they sometimes resort to economic analysis to inform
their lobbying efforts by helping to determine which potential public
policies will advance their interests. These uses make sense-and
happily supply employment for economists. Of course, these uses
also make profitability the focus of attention. But that should be fine,
should it not? Profitability comes from being efficient, and efficiency
is what we should want. After all, it advances the public welfare! As
long as certain means are not used-illegal or monopolistic means-
we are taught that becoming more profitable serves the social good.
In fact, the discipline of market competition is the dynamic factor that
requires "efficiency" and enforces a profit orientation. 49 These
thoughts readily lead to the conclusion that restraints on free trade
are bad for the same reason that monopoly is bad: both limit
competition that ultimately serves the consumer. Little more needs
to be considered on the issue of international trade, although
economists sometimes add to their assault on protectionism the
observation that trade restraints unfairly reduce profits for those
(American) firms that otherwise would be able to compete fully and
freely.50
146. Discretion suggests that I include no cites here.
147. See, e.g., WILDMAN & SIVEK, supra note 6; Shao, supra note 2.
148. This combination is routinely described as "business judgment," which, when
executives are lucky, results in plentiful stock options in their annual bonuses.
149. See supra note 125 (discussing the effects of market forces).
150. One of Noam's chief complaints about European public broadcasting is that it
gave the public broadcasters monopsony power, which they used to obtain a "subsidy from
the despised Hollywood." NOAM, supra note 18, at 20. In effect, he accuses European
public broadcasters of unfairly cheating Hollywood out of their appropriate profits. See
id. at 15-17.
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The primary error of this complacent economics arises from
treating firms' orientation toward profits as equivalent to an
orientation toward efficiency. The commonsense notion of
"efficiency" is instrumental effectiveness at achieving some goal. In
the economic realm, the goal might be maximization of something
called "utility" or happiness. But even a frictionless, perfectly
functioning market cannot be expected to maximize utility. To do so,
the system would have to respond properly to interpersonal
differences in utility, which presumably would require at least that
distributional concerns be appropriately taken into account.'5'
Instead, the goal might be described cynically as effectively achieving
whatever a perfectly functioning market achieves. But this
characterization sells the notion of efficiency somewhat short. In
economic analysis, efficiency normally refers to maximally serving
preferences weighted not by their interpersonal strength but by their
expression within a market that perfectly and costlessly responds to
people's willingness and ability to pay.52  This conception of
efficiency defines the goal. Given this conception, because selling to
the person who will pay the most is both efficient and most profitable,
the two are often thoughtlessly equated. This equation is wrong.
Each of this Essay's three economic critiques of free trade has
focused on the satisfaction of people's preferences. But these
critiques are largely irrelevant to the needs of a firm operating in the
market. Firms trying to maximize profits can or must ignore some
consumer preferences or some aspects of those preferences that
relate to the firms' practices. Obviously, a critique of willingness and
ability to pay as a measure of preferences (the third critique) is simply
pointless for a firm only interested in what people will pay. The same
is true for externalities (the second critique). For the firm, even if
externalities reflect real preferences that people theoretically are
willing to pay to satisfy, as long as they are externalities-that is, as
long as the firm cannot figure out how to internalize positive
externalities or can continue to avoid internalizing negative
externalities-these preferences are not brought to bear on the firm's
151. See C. Edwin Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justifications for State Action
Increasing Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39,40-48 (1974).
152. Eventually recognizing the disconnect between efficiency and utility, Posner once
explained that the real normative concern was not with utility (or happiness) but with
"wealth," which he defined in terms of what would be paid in a perfectly functioning
market. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). But cf C. Edwin Baker,
Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939, 948-53 (1980)
(critiquing Posner's analysis).
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decisions, usually because of transaction costs or collective action
problems. Externalities are irrelevant because they fall into neither
the firm's expense nor revenue column.153  Finally, factors
determining who will win within monopolistic competition need to be
understood by market-based firms. For example, there is a tendency
toward monopoly when firms sell unique but similar goods that have
significant public good features. However, the question of whether
the winner will be most "efficient" (the first critique) -that is,
whether the surplus the winner will produce will be greater than the
surplus that would have been produced by firms whose failure the
winner causes-is irrelevant from this firm-based perspective.' 4
Forceful criticisms of any assumed identity of profitability and
preference satisfaction or efficiency are common. For example, critics
observe that the market gives corporations an incentive to spend
money either to increase productivity or to weaken the power of
unions so that the firms can pay workers less. The latter increases
profits not by creating wealth, by satisfying preferences, or by being
efficient, but by transferring wealth from workers to the firm. A
profit-oriented firm, however, ignores the distinction. Profit
maximization requires that it engage in both as long as the marginal
gain to the firm from each expenditure is greater than its cost to the
firM.15 5
Despite their importance, such critiques are not my concern
here. Rather, my concern is sociological. My hypothesis is that
economic reasoning often ignores these issues by ending too early and
that it does so because analysts have become too accustomed to
adopting intuitively the profit perspective of firms. The problem is
the common assumption, noted above, that profitability and
efficiency are equivalent. That fallacy blocks any consciousness of
cutting short the analysis.
Free trade does promote profitability, at least for those media
153. This claim is somewhat of an overstatement. A firm has an incentive to devote
some resources to finding ways of capturing or internalizing positive externalities, that is,
to find a way to get payments from those who benefit. Likewise, the firm has an incentive
to use resources to find ways to foist costs onto others, thereby increasing negative
externalities, and to resist attempts to enforce internalization. Externalizing costs and
avoiding internalization are major incentives and explain many corporate political and
lobbying activities that, when this is their goal, hardly advance the public good, although
these political activities can be very profitable investments of corporate resources.
154. I once asked a major academic economist about the lost consumer surplus created
by monopolistic competition. His reply was, roughly, that it is wrong to consider
consumer surplus because it cannot be measured by the market, and the market is the only
objective source of information about what people want.
155. See supra note 14.
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firms that happen to have a "comparative advantage," such as many
dominant, American film and television program providers. Probably
the best economic treatment of international trade in media products,
Wildman and Siwek's International Trade in Films and Television
Programs, was written explicitly from the perspective of "creating the
policy alternatives necessary to enhance the international
competitiveness of American services. ' 156  In the context of
bemoaning that "consumer welfare alone has rarely proven to be a
persuasive argument in trade negotiations,"157 Wildman and Siwek
state as basically uncontroversial that "[i]t is true that consumers in
countries that restrict the importation of foreign films ... would be
better off if these restrictions were eased. 15  Similar remarks fill the
academic literature.
The virtually universal assumption that consumers would get
more of what they want from free trade profitability seems relatively
unproblematic only from the perspective of a corporate, profit-
oriented economics that ignores the consumer-oriented, social
welfare economics emphasized in this Essay. This Essay's
"academic" economics is simply irrelevant for corporations'
responses to market opportunities. Once implicitly adopting the
corporate perspective, the typical article merely asks whether free
trade, which it identifies with both economic efficiency and consumer
welfare, should be compromised on the basis of some other value,
such as culture. Often the commentator suggests that this cultural
interest is essentially elitist and anti-egalitarian. If more generous,
the author recognizes this cultural interest as real, but usually still
proceeds to belittle rather than to explore it.
In contrast, from a consumer-oriented, social welfare
perspective, reasons to doubt the merits of unimpeded free trade
156. Claude E. Barfield, Editor's Foreword, in WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at
xiii.
157. WILDMAN & SIWEK, supra note 6, at 158.
158. Il at 157. They state in passing that foreign "audiences are the obvious losers"
from import restrictions with the only analysis being that this conclusion is shown by the
audiences' purchasing or viewing habits. Id. at 121.
Sometimes their readiness to associate free trade with all things good seems to blind
them to their own careful economic analysis. For example, Wildman and Siwek carefully
demonstrate that free trade would reduce the total number of films produced
internationally, see id. at 74, and possibly would "eliminate all film production in smaller
countries," id. at 75. They then casually comment that restrictions on trade "limit both the
quantity and the variety of the films and television programming from which an audience
can choose." Id. at 121. In fact, properly designed trade restrictions that burden but do
not bar imports could help to assure that a nation's audiences receive both domestic and
foreign films, which would seem to increase variety and, possibly, quantity.
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cannot be systematically ignored. Although empirical issues make
any conclusion uncertain, the possibility that policy alternatives could
improve on unregulated trade becomes evident. Thus, my
methodological plea is that those who invoke economic analysis
should do so not merely from the perspective of the firm. Rather,
they should recognize the normative concerns on which economics
claims to be founded: people's welfare and preference satisfaction.
Free traders rightly emphasize the liberal value of access to new and
outside views. But liberals also should recognize the value of each
nation, and even of each group within a nation, being able to
participate in creating and having its own media. Even when people
are willing to pay dearly for this media, monopolistic competition,
externalities, and market criteria themselves may cause markets to
fail to identify and to measure accurately preferences for this
outcome. When people as both consumers and citizens value these
media sources, efficiency itself may require restraints on free trade.
E. An International Public Sphere?
A reader might suspect that I am skeptical of international trade
specifically and globalization more generally. Indeed I am.
Nevertheless, all the arguments in this Essay have been media
specific. They have related to special, identifiable aspects of media
products that could justify restraints even if international free trade
principles generally are approved. Still, critics may argue that my
analysis is antiquated. Many astute observers conclude that
globalization-the code word of the 1990s-is inevitable. If so, a
quite plausible, media-specific, non-economic argument may favor
free trade.
The argument is:'59
(1) Economic globalization is already a fact and is rapidly
expanding. The major economic players today are
multinational corporations that produce tremendous wealth
and tremendous profits. With more revenue than most
nation-states' domestic products, these multinational
corporations are owned and operated internationally.
159. This argument generally follows analysis offered by Habermas. See HABERMAS,
supra note 133, at 105-61 (discussing the future of the nation-state). Interestingly, I have
not seen this argument for free trade clearly articulated in the U.S. scholarship favoring
free trade in media products. The argument may be too visionary and too dependent on
speculative developments for the purportedly pragmatic American authors who write on
free trade. Still, intuitive belief in the argument might influence some people's thinking on
the subject. Thus, addressing it explicitly seems warranted.
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(2) Just as the United States discovered a century ago with
respect to domestic corporate giants and trusts, unregulated
corporations often turn lawless. Even when they do not,
they often exercise power in socially disastrous ways,
ranging from their treatment of labor to their effect on the
environment (as well as their corruption of democratic
politics).
(3) Therefore, only legal regulation coming from
government-presumably a democratic and populous
government-can limit these disasters and channel
corporate power into more benign uses.
(4) These corporations' power and their capacity to exploit
the opportunities of international markets have nevertheless
left traditional nation-states with increasingly little room to
maneuver or even to perform traditional welfare-state roles.
In many respects, these corporations are the world's new
sovereigns.
(5) Given their power, enhanced by the mobility of capital,
to evade nation-states' regulations and to make most
attempts to regulate disastrous for the regulating country,
the world today vitally needs global governmental bodies
with the reach and power to monitor, regulate, and control
global corporations and global capital. To some extent these
global bodies are already taking shape, albeit usually as
bodies of experts with little democratic or popular control.
(6) This non-democratic aspect of evolving global bodies is
troubling. A partial solution might be greater transparency,
but transparency is hardly enough if bodies, such as the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or the
World Trade Organization, feel free to do as they wish
despite public exposure. Any believer in democracy and
self-government must favor global political structures that
are more democratically responsive.
(7) Just as public spheres are absolutely crucial for nation-
state democracies, a global public sphere where public
opinion is developed and brought to bear on "democratic
will formation"'16 is absolutely essential for any global
democracy.' 61
(8) The need for such global public spheres suggests the
160. Id. at 153, 160.
161. See id. at 124, 127, 153, 160-61. Unfortunately, these assertions, usually
concluding Habermas's analysis, do not discuss in detail the appropriate form of these
public spheres.
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need for global media. Therefore, as compared with other
trade restraints, restrictions on trade and other international
operations of the media are especially objectionable.
There is force to this argument. To begin, I find unassailable the
points about the extent and dangers of global capitalism and the need
to subject it to democratic political control. Nevertheless, I want to
note two vulnerabilities in this argument that should lead to rejecting
its final conclusion. My first criticism relates to the fourth and fifth
points about the inadequacy of traditional governments and the
necessity, as well as possibility, of global, democratic bodies. The
second criticism questions whether even the goal of global democratic
bodies served by appropriate public sphere(s) implies the eighth
point, regarding the desirability of avoiding national restraints on
trade in media products.
Certainly, a democrat can be sensibly pessimistic about the near-
term prospects for an effective and democratic world government.
Although working to improve the long-term chances of such a
government is surely a possible goal, given the reasonable pessimism
about if and when these efforts will bear fruit, a more immediate
strategy may be to work to maintain and increase the power of
nation-states to control multinational corporations, especially as these
corporations operate in or affect that nation-state. Although the
structural position of multinational corporations may inevitably limit
national power, the room for nation-states to maneuver may depend
significantly on political will within the state. Of course, this political
will is also often blunted by multinational corporations' domestic
political power, the bases of which range from general ideological
dominance to huge campaign contributions and to the capacity to
threaten to move capital and jobs. Still, multinational corporations'
political power is unlikely to be any less influential within currently
possible international bodies. Rather, the more democratic structure
of nation-states should make resistance easier there. Opposition to
misbehavior by and to greater political hegemony of multinational
corporations can be a crucial part of partisan domestic politics. This
politics should aim at slowing down the evisceration of national
sovereignty, except when the reduction serves democratic principles,
such as grants of power to international bodies to protect human
rights, or when it serves other democratically determined interests.
This strategy suggests selective opposition to trade agreements, a
position that many progressives in the United States and Canada have
taken over the last decade in their reservations about or opposition to
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NAFTA or the Multilateral Agreement Investment.1 62  More
- generally, even if many functions of local democracy eventually will
be replaced by global democratic institutions, the best current
strategy requires opposition to any changes that weaken currently
existing domestic democracy. Importantly, this approach means
avoiding any policy that would weaken domestic public spheres and
the media on which they depend. Of course, a major claim,
developed in both the cultural and the economic sections of this
Essay, is that free trade in media products is such a policy.
Second, accepting the democratic aspiration for global
democratic governmental bodies and recognizing their dependence
on appropriate public spheres do not lead automatically to the eighth
point, that this goal is furthered best by international free trade in
media products. It may not even imply the seventh point, that the
most needed public spheres, other than that of the "strong" public
sphere within the global parliament itself, are themselves global in
dimension. Without a doubt, global democracy requires global
circulation of information. Circulation may be adequately served by
limitations on censorship, as required by basic human rights norms,
and by technological developments as illustrated by the Internet. In
comparison with global media, strong domestic media may do as well
or better in promoting public awareness and discussion of globally
relevant information. Certainly, global democracy and global public
spheres do not require the leveling of cultural differences or the
merging of cultures any more than national public spheres require
this leveling within the multiethnic nation-state. 163 As repeatedly
shown, unadorned reliance on markets has been inadequate for the
public spheres democratically required by traditional nation-states.16
Democracy within a country is better served by appropriate
162. One of the major political defeats of President Clinton's second term related to his
request in 1997 for fast-track authority relating primarily to the planned Multilateral
Agreement Investment. The effective opposition-especially of labor, but also
environmentalist and other activist groups-stemmed not from general opposition to
international trade but rather from objections regarding the undemocratic manner in
which they saw it being structured. See, e.g., David Moberg, Global Economy Needs
Regulating, NEWSDAY (Bay Shore, N.Y.), Dec. 9, 1997, at A41, available in 1997 WL
2721469. For those conscious of this battle, the 1999 demonstrations and workshops in
Seattle should not have been a surprise. See supra note 7 (noting the struggle).
163. Habermas's critique of identifying the nation-state with a mythical ethnic people
rather than with democratically legitimatized law involves a similar rejection of the
necessity of leveling cultural differences, something that many critics of a European
democratic government thought would be necessary but impossible. See HABERMAS,
supra note 133, at 105-61.
164. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 35, at 383-408.
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government interventions in the media order. This is likely to be
equally true for any global democracy. This conclusion, of course,
leaves open the question of whether a global democratic government
itself (when such an entity exists 65) or smaller political units,
specifically, nation-states (as long as they continue to exist) will best
be able to formulate appropriate interventions. In any event,
instinctive reliance on free trade hardly seems appropriate.
Both the type of needed interventions and the level of
government best able to design and implement these interventions
can be informed by a consideration of the nature of the public
sphere(s) that would best serve a global democracy. Obviously, no
global discourse could meaningfully involve all individuals within a
single discourse. The physical capacity of the Internet, or any other
version of a global public sphere, has little to do with the limited
number of people who can meaningfully participate in an actual
single discussion. Meaningful democratic discourse within a single
state-whether multicultural state or a state divided by class, gender,
race, or religion requires that subgroups be able to engage in internal
discourses to formulate their own visions. Subgroups must then be
able to present those visions powerfully in negotiations with other
groups who have different visions as well as in discourses of self-
understanding and justice with governing bodies and the rest of
society. The same should be true within a global democracy. Any
absence of well-developed group discourses leaves the overarching
public sphere open to easy domination by elites, whether corporate,
technical, or governmental elites. Within nation-state democracies, a
major defect of the market is its empirical failure to provide adequate
media for the discourse and political functions of the otherwise
marginalized subgroups of society-failure to provide for what Nancy
Fraser calls "subaltern counterpublics."'6 6
It is likely to be the same or worse on the global stage. Even
groups that have not been marginalized domestically often will be
marginalized globally. Thus, for a global democracy to represent
anything other than domination by powerful elites requires similar
protection and nourishment of counterpublics and subpublics. The
composition of these subpublics will be diverse, encompassing both
165. To the extent that the United Nations can be considered a prototype, the United
States's rather rabid opposition to UNESCO's attempt to formulate a non-censorious
media policy during the debate over the New World Information and Communication
Order (NWICO) illustrates a greater ideological commitment to free trade than to either
local or global democracy. See infra notes 182--84 and accompanying text.
166. Fraser, supra note 46, at 123 (emphasis omitted).
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subaltern groups within an individual country and labor, social
movement, and ethnic groups that cross national boundaries. A
major focus, however, will be on nourishing general public spheres of
smaller political entities, especially of the smaller or developing
nation-states. 16 7 In other words, global democracy requires national
capacity to restrain and supplement free trade precisely in the ways
otherwise called for in this Essay-interventions designed to assure
vigorous domestic media serving national, cultural, and political
discourse functions.
IlI. POLICY SUMMARY
This Essay argues that free trade will not provide the media
products that people in various countries desire. As a consequence,
governments will need to intervene in ways that violate free trade
principles. This conclusion by itself does not indicate what type of
interventions are needed. Moreover, because trade does provide
access to valuable media content, some forms of protectionism surely
could be worse than free trade. The goal here is to identify the types
of interventions that would be appropriate and how the international
legal order could increase the chances that these, rather than
objectionable forms of protectionism, would prevail.
In thinking about this issue, Oliver Goodenough makes a useful
distinction. He contrasts "strong protection," which has an
exclusionary goal, with "weak protection," which is designed to
promote choice by keeping domestic products in existence.' ts When
he eventually condemns cultural protectionism, he clearly means
strong protectionism, as evidenced by his continued defense of the
propriety of weak protection, such as subsidies intended to preserve
167. This concern with the impact of trade on the cultural industries of weaker
economies is quite pronounced internationally. Representative are views such as those of
Mia Bottley, Minister of Education, Youth, and Culture from Barbados, who suggests that
larger countries "lack sensitivity to the particular needs of small island states," FINAL
REPORT, supra note 34, at 16, and Abdelbaki Hermassi, Cultural Minister of Tunisia, who
argues that international trade agreements pose a much greater threat to countries in the
South, where they could have a "devastating effect," id. at 17. See id. at 16-17; cf. supra
note 141 (noting the rejection of the Stockholm Protocol).
168. Goodenough, supra note 13, at 211 (emphasis omitted). Goodenough includes
"economic subsidies and affirmative quotas for Canadian production" as examples of
weak protectionism and "flat prohibitions, negative quotas, and other significant barriers
on imports" as illustrating strong protectionism. Ld. In this latter category he includes
minimum quotas for Canadian content in Canadian broadcasting and the import
prohibitions and excise taxes on split-run magazines invalidated by the WTO decision, see
id. at 212-14, although it is not clear why some of these, such as the minimum quota for
Canadian content, are not better characterized as "affirmative quotas" or subsidies.
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choice.169
In both its culture and economic Parts, this Essay parallels
Goodenough in condemning strong protection while recognizing a
useful role for weak protection. Weak protectionism can serve
culture when culture is conceived of as a context of choice. In
contrast, strong protectionism counteracts this reason for valuing
culture. Only the museum conception of culture justifies the
exclusions required by strong protection. An economic focus on
providing consumers with what they want can hardly justify strong
protectionism's exclusion of media products that consumers wish to
receive. It can, however, justify weak protectionism's concern with
properly pricing imports and with the continued availability of valued
local cultural materials. Each economic subsection of this Essay has
observed that sometimes markets fail to maximally provide people
with the media products that they want. The obvious policy
recommendation is to provide the desired products-hence the
propriety of subsidies. Still, other, more complex policies may be
equally useful. Sometimes, consumers might be better off, on
balance, with fewer imported media products than free trade would
provide if the result is that they get more of those products that they
value more but otherwise would not obtain. Policies can also produce
net benefits if they burden media products with significantly more
negative than positive externalities or if they restrict the competitive
success of media goods that undermine the financial viability or reach
of more valued materials. Still, neither subsidies nor these limited
impact restrictions are designed to be exclusionary, and they are
unlikely to be so in practice. These policies attempt to expand or
empower choice and, thus, do not fit the notion of strong protection.
In fact, given that only weak protectionism seems justifiable, it might
be surprising if a democracy ever attempts anything else.
Thus, Goodenough's categories are fine. The difficulty comes
with their interpretation and implementation. For example,
Goodenough treats many Canadian policies as involving strong
protectionism, especially the Canadian Tariff's flat prohibition on
importing split-run magazines 7 ' and the 80% tax on Canadian
169. See id. at 252. Goodenough is quite clear that subsidies have important and
defensible uses. See id at 235-36.
170. Tariff Code 9958 prohibited importation of "a split run or a regional edition] that
contained an advertisement that was primarily directed to a market in Canada, and that
did not appear in identical form in all editions ... distributed in [the periodical's] country
of origin." Customs Tariff, ch. 49, sched. VII, code 9958, 1987 S.C. 3308, 3310 (Can.); see
also Goodenough, supra note 13, at 213 n.44 (quoting Tariff Code 9958).
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advertising in split-run magazines printed in Canada.171 Like most
American commentators, Goodenough seems ready to sign on to the
1997 decision by the WTO declaring that Canada's provisions
violated GAT.' 72
This characterization of the tariff prohibition and the advertising
tax is wrong. Canada did not try to exclude any foreign magazines,
that is, magazines printed and sold outside Canada. Imports were
welcomed. Rather, the tariff only required that when magazines
come in, the magazines have basically the same advertising that they
had when sold in other national markets or, more precisely, that the
magazines not have different advertisements "directed to a market in
Canada."'73 This requirement is hardly an attempt to keep out
foreign ideas or foreign magazines. Instead, its obvious purpose was
"to ensure that Canadian [and Canadian-oriented] advertising
expenditures support Canadian magazines."174 In that sense, the tariff
was a legal arrangement designed to get Canadians, specifically
Canadian businesses that advertise, to subsidize Canadian
magazines-a clear example of weak protectionism.
These measures to get Canadian advertisers to subsidize
Canadian magazines could be vital to the survival of Canadian
magazines. Advertising provides about 60% of Canadian magazine
revenue. 75 Canadian magazines' operating profit is 2.5% of revenues
(compared to 12% for American magazines). 76 The Canadian
Magazines Publishers Association has "estimated that the entire
magazine industry's profits could be wiped out completely with only a
[3%] shift in [Canadian advertising] dollars to American
publications.' 77  According to a Canadian government task force,
allowing the U.S. split-run magazines to include advertising directed
171. Bill C-103 closed a possible loophole: printing the Canadian edition in Canada
and thereby not engaging in importation the bill imposed an 80% excise tax on the
Canadian advertising of such a locally produced split-run publication. See Goodenough,
supra note 13, at 214.
172. Although much about the WTO decision's legal analysis can be criticized, and
although it seemed to adopt much too much of a commodity orientation in its notion of
comparable goods and its analysis of "directly competitive or substitutable products,"
WTO Report, supra note 7, a critique of the legal reasoning is not needed for the purposes
of this Essay. For an effective legal critique of the decision, see Matheny, supra note 13,
passim.
173. Customs Tariff, ch. 49, sched. VII, code 9958, 1987 S.C. at 3310.
174. Magder, supra note 5, at 5. As Magder correctly observes, "[n]one of the
Canadian measures [struck down by the WTO decision] were designed to block the entry
into Canada of foreign magazines with foreign content." Id. at 49.
175. See id. at 49.
176. See id. at 28.
177. Van Harpen, supra note 10, at 173-74 (citation omitted).
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at their Canadian readers could reduce advertising revenue for
Canadian magazines by almost 40%. This predicted decline is
similar to the 40% of total Canadian magazine advertising revenue
captured by Canadian editions of American magazines around 1960
before the adoption of protectionist measures. 9 Small wonder that
observers suggest that implementing the WTO decision is likely to be
devastating for Canadian magazines. At various times in the past,
without protection, American magazines have held roughly 80% of
the Canadian market. 80 In 1992, after the Canadian government
introduced measures aimed not at keeping American magazines out
but at keeping them from taking advertising away from Canadian
magazines, Canadian magazines increased to more than two-thirds of
the Canadian circulation.181
Canadian magazines potentially can make crucial contributions
specifically to the Canadian political order and more generally to
Canadian discourses of identity. These magazines potentially
represent precisely the type of cultural media that this Essay has
argued may fail competitively even though they produce positive
externalities and even though they may be more valued by consumers
than the imports that replace them. These magazines will fail, but not
because Canadian audiences will not purchase them if American
magazines are available; they will lose competitively because of price.
If American magazines receive the subsidy provided by Canadian
advertising dollars, then the Canadian magazines would be priced too
high, relative to the American ones, for the Canadian magazines to
succeed. Canada's attempt to ensure that Canadian advertising goes
to Canadian magazines does not exclude foreign imports. Rather, it
attempts to subsidize Canadian magazines. This subsidy is justifiable
weak protectionism, and Goodenough should have recognized it as
such. Canada's view that its advertisers are a resource that should
support Canadian media products is hardly unreasonable.
Nevertheless, not only did the panel and appellate body of the WTO
find that the Canadian effort violates GATT provisions, but
Goodenough also concluded that it is exclusionary. Why did they all
go wrong?
178. See Magder, supra note 5, at 28-29.
179. See idL at 10.
180. Although the quality of the data is unclear, U.S. magazines reportedly held more
than 80% of the Canadian market in the 1920s, see id. at 7, and by the late 1960s roughly
130 million out of 160 million copies of magazines (81%) sold in Canada were American,
see id. at 12-13.
181. See id. at 13.
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This question points to my final suggestion. The professional
orientation of practitioners of trade law is likely to tilt toward more
commodified analyses. After all, commodification is the premise of
trade. Given this orientation, these practitioners are likely to see
exclusion even in regulations that cultural supporters would identify
as weak protectionism. Likewise, trade-law practitioners are likely to
attribute unacceptably protectionist purposes to regulatory policies
even when important, legitimate justifications exist for such policies.
Predictably, trade-law practitioners will misapply even properly
designed trade rules to make them more restrictive of national
sovereignty in the media context than is desirable, just as
Goodenough misapplied his useful notion of strong protectionism. If
this bias is a regular feature of a trade-law regime, the question is
whether there is any way for the legal order to do better. Despite the
evils of strong protectionism, possibly the best hope of most often
getting justifiable results is to leave all decisions related to media
products solely to national discretion-that is, to exempt cultural
materials from all free trade agreements. In practice, application of
trade rules is likely to prevent democratic countries from adopting
economically justified regulatory programs more often than it would
thwart objectionably strong protectionism.
An even better option would be to develop international law
principles that allow domestic regulation of trade in media products
but could still block at least the worst cases of strong protectionism.
As noted, strong protectionism has little legitimacy despite its allure
for undemocratic traditionalist elites. The international norms that
strong protectionism most obviously violates, however, are not
economic ones, but rather are human rights principles concerning
freedom of information. In fact, because the exclusionary goal of
protectionism usually is to silence "impure" communication inputs,
often it will be pursued through content-based censorship that applies
equally to domestic and foreign media goods, thereby evading offense
to free trade principles. If this characterization is right, the global
community should use international human rights law, not trade law,
to identify impermissible national burdens or restraints on imported
media products.
Admittedly, this strategy creates serious dangers. Corporate
media interests might pervert human rights law to serve their own
purposes. History suggests such an attempt will occur. During the
late 1970s and early 1980s, UNESCO studied national and world
media structures from the perspective of serving the legitimate
interests of all nations. This effort culminated in the MacBride
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Commission Report, m written under the leadership of Sean
MacBride, an Irish diplomat, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and, as the
American press regularly noted, a Lenin Peace Prize winner. An
accurate summary description of the MacBride Commission Report,
given in a law review comment, is that it "advocated the elimination
of governmental interference and censorship, the decentralization of
the mass media, high standards of professionalism for journalists, and
a better balance in the contents and coverage of mass media
reporting."''
Look at that summary again. Surely, such a report should delight
anyone committed to a free press and a sound communications order.
So what did the author of this summary conclude? Without reference
to any language in the report, he concluded that a "proposal based on
the MacBride Report's recommendations conflicts with both the First
Amendment and international standards because a major component
of such a proposal involves governmental control over the flow of
information and ideas."' 4 This misguided evaluation might be merely
the assessment of a confused law student. But it is not. Also without
textual reference to anything within the Report, Leonard J. Theberge,
Chair of the American Bar Association Section of International
Law's Committee on International Communications, described the
Third World view purportedly represented by the report as one in
which "the state has a duty ... to censor incoming and outgoing
news."18s He accused the MacBride Commission and UNESCO of
"deviat[ing] from earlier international legal precepts based on
protecting individual rather than governmental rights.' ' 86 An article
182. INTERNATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS,
MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (1980) [hereinafter the MACBRIDE COMMISSION REPORT].
183. Michael J. Farley, Comment, Conflicts over Government Control of Information-
the United States and UNESCO, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1071,1076 (1985).
184. IL at 1088.
185. Leonard J. Theberge, U.N.E.S.C.O.'s "New World Information Order": Colliding
with First Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A. J. 714,715-16 (1981); cf. Wolfgang Kleinwachter,
Three Waves of the Debate, in THE GLOBAL MEDIA DEBATE: ITS RISE, FALL, AND
RENEWAL, supra note 4, at 13,16 ("[Not a single paragraph in all the NWICO resolutions
included restrictions or censorship for Western mass media, and ... both the Mass Media
Declaration and the resolution of the MacBride Report reaffirmed the principle of
freedom of information as a basic human right .... "); A.H. Raskin, U.S. News Coverage
of the Belgrade UNESCO Conference, J. COMM., Autumn 1981, at 164, 171 (quoting the
observation of John G. Massee, a staff member of the MacBride Commission, that
"nothing coming out of the MacBride Report or UNESCO ... suggests a curtailment of
news flow").
186. Theberge, supra note 185, at 718. To prove his point about earlier precepts from
which the MacBride Report deviates, Theberge quotes language, which he approves, from
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See id. He inexplicably fails to
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prepared under the direction of Sarah Goddard Power, a deputy
assistant secretary in the State Department, echoed Theberge's points
and emphasized that the United States "strongly oppose[s]" some of
the eighty-two recommendations."" Elsewhere, James Buckley,
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and
Technology is described as seeing "NWICO [New World Information
and Communication Order] as a serious threat to First Amendment
values. ''ls  Newspapers in the United States exhibited the same
hostility. The National News Council found that American
newspaper coverage of the six-week Belgrade UNESCO conference
that considered the MacBride Commision Report completely ignored
the conference's extensive work in a vast array of areas. The
newspapers did, however, contain 173 news stories and 181 editorials
on the debate over communications policy. All the editorials
expressed apprehension, with 158 being strongly hostile and the other
23 critical but moderate in tone, with the news reports generally
edited to reinforce the editorial perspective.8 9
This vilification and misreporting might be hard to understand if
First Amendment values, which the Report largely embodied, were
the critics' real concern. The American objection, however, may have
had little to do with censorship. Apparently more troubling to the
critics was the MacBride Commission's conclusion that in many parts
of the world, governments would need to play a significant role in
promoting a better communications order. Curiously, none of these
critics appear to note that this is precisely what the United States did
in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by using the postal
note that the language he quotes is virtually identical to language in the third conclusion of
the MacBride Report. See FEw VOICES, MANY WORLDs 46 (Michael Traber & Kaarle
Nordenstreng eds., 1992) (reprinting the "Conclusions and Recommendations" of the
MACBRIDE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 182). Conclusion 3 asserts that
"communication is a basic individual right" and that "[fjreedom of information-and,
more specifically the right to seek, receive and impart information-is a fundamental
human right." I&L
187. The U.S. View of Belgrade, J. COMM., Autumn 1981, at 142, 143 (reprinting an
excerpt from Assessment of Information and Communications Issues, 21st General
Conference of UNESCO, Sept. 23-Oct. 28, 1980).
188. William Fitzmaurice, Note, The New World Information and Communication
Order: Is the International Programme for the Development of Communication the
Answer?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 953, 979 n.87 (1983).
189. See Raskin, supra note 185, at 166-67; see also George Gerbner, Unesco in the
U.S. Press, in THE GLOBAL MEDIA DEBATE: ITS RISE, FALL, AND RENEWAL, supra
note 4, at 111, 117-20 (providing. a similar characterization of the news reporting
surrounding the MacBride Report). Interestingly, Raskin can hardly be seen as some anti-
press radical; rather, he is a former assistant editor of the New York Times editorial page
and Associate Director of the National News Council. See Raskin, supra note 185, at 164.
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service to provide major subsidies to newspapers, with the subsidies
designed to help structure the industry in a manner that purposefully
favored certain types of newspapers and, thereby, certain types of
content.9 ' Indeed, the United States and virtually all democratic
countries continue to enhance the communications order, although in
some cases, such as public broadcasting, these involvements have
been subject to increasing assault through pressure on their
governmental funding and, especially in Western Europe,
competition from commercial broadcasters.'9' American
commentators found the recommendation that " 'in expanding
communication systems, preference should be given to non-
commercial forms of mass communication' " and suggesting that
" 'public funds might be made available for this purpose' " as they are
for education to be particularly objectionable.'" Of course, this
recommendation looks little different than a national policy in Britain
to expand the British communications system by creating the British
Broadcasting Corporation or little different than tax exemptions
given in the United States. Although neither this recommendation
nor any other portion of the MacBride Commission Report suggested
any limitations on the freedom of privately owned media, American
Bar Association representative Leonard Theberge condemned the
Report for having a "clear bias against private sector involvement in
communications." 93  The United States Department of State
190. See, e.g., RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST
OFFICE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION, 1700-1860S (1989); RICHARD BURKET
KIELBOWICZ, ORIGINS OF THE SECOND-CLASS MAIL CATEGORY AND THE BUSINESS OF
POLICYMAKING, 1863-1879passim (Journalism Monographs No. 96, Apr. 1986).
191. The eventual consequence of the increasing presence of private commercial
television, authorized over the last 20 years in liberal democracies outside the United
States, is still unsettled. James Curran, for example, has challenged Elihu Katz's view that
this development will erode public support for continued large government subsidies for
and viewership of public broadcasting, with a consequent splintering of the audience and a
weakening of the public sphere required for liberal democracy. Compare Elihu Katz, And
Deliver Us from Segmentation, 546 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 22
(1996) (arguing that with public television broadcasting giving way to commercial
broadcasting, "[w]e have all but lost television as the medium of national political
integration"), with James Curran, Crisis of Public Communication: A Reappraisal, in
MEDIA, RITUAL AND IDENTITY, supra note 38, at 174 (taking issue with Katz's position
and arguing that "only by opening up [broadcasting] to more voices will it be possible to
strengthen public identification with the broadcasting system").
192. Fitzmaurice, supra note 188, at 980 n.97 (quoting MACBRIDE COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 182, at 260, Recommendation 31).
193. Theberge, supra note 185, at 716. As evidence of this bias, Theberge quoted a
statement by UNESCO Director General M'Bow, who commented that "'an increasing
concentration of media in the hands of a few private or public enterprises' is a major
issue." IL (quoting UNESCO Director General M'Bow); cf Power, supra note 187, at
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considered a "major troublesome aspect of the [UNESCO] Director-
General's comments" to be his suggestion that "more work needs to
be done on such questions as ... 'an increasing concentration of
media in the hands of a few private or public enterprises.' "194 1
assume it is troublesome because United States policy apparently
favors concentration, 195 despite its undemocratic nature and its
conflict with First Amendment principles.96 The State Department's
Sarah Goddard Power called further attempts to decentralize the
media simply "unacceptable to the U.S."''9
What happened? Probably the best assessment is that the
United States's response to NWICO was totally captured by a
combination of corporate interests and cold war fears. The United
States seemed to equate corporate interests-free trade and
commercial dominance-with the meaning of the First Amendment
and international human rights. It opposed the possibility that non-
commercial media would receive substantial support or that
commercial media would be restricted by, for example, antitrust-like
principles. Similar attempts to characterize human rights as pro-
market or pro-corporate are likely to reoccur. Attempts, however, do
not mean success. In the past, American commercial media interests
argued unsuccessfully that applying labor laws or antitrust laws to the
media violates the First Amendment.19 They regularly made similar
claims in litigation against media-specific structural regulation in the
United States, but those arguments routinely failed before the
Supreme Court.199  Although commercial interests undoubtedly
would similarly invoke international human rights law as the basis to
oppose trade restrictions designed to support local media, the
challenge is likely to fare no better than it did when based on the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court. On the other hand, when
national legislation is really exclusionary and censorious, human
rights law is the proper field of dispute. Challenges to the legislation
144 (stating that the "MacBride Report... exhibits a clear bias against the involvement of
the private sector in communications").
194. Power, supra note 187, at 144 (quoting UNESCO Director General M'Bow).
195. This preference for concentration more recently has been the quite explicit policy
of the Commerce Department, at least when considering international trade. See
NATIONAL TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUB. No.
93-290, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA 123-98 (1993).
196. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
197. Power, supra note 187, at 144.
198. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 19-20 (upholding the application of antitrust laws
to the press); Associated Press v NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937) (upholding the
application of labor laws to the press).
199. See Baker, supra note 81, at 93-114.
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should prevail, although the success of these challenges may require
considerable development of the effective force and reach on
international human rights law.
Thus, my suggestion is that human rights law, unlike trade law,
provides a legal context likely to lead interpreters to be sensitive both
to countries' need to nourish their own media and to the human rights
mandate that countries not isolate their citizens from diverse
viewpoints and troublesome ideas. Reliance on human rights law
might even have a positive side effect. Given the prospect of
multinational media corporations operating on the world stage, it
would be desirable for the structure of the legal order to make
corporate interests dependent on further development of
international human rights law rather than on further invocations of
trade law that simply enlarge the rule of multinational capital.
CONCLUSION
The United States's willingness to stand up for principle in the
new global order is good. And though free trade in media products
obviously provides great benefits for American media businesses,
most American advocates of free trade see their position as based on
the principled goal of giving media consumers access to the
communication and cultural products they desire. On closer
inspection, Part II of this Essay concludes that this essentially
economic argument is wrong in its economics. Applying free trade
principles to international trade in media products often will thwart
the preferences of consumers and citizens-both those around the
globe and those in the United States. Part I suggests that the
American position also blindly attributes to foreign advocates of
protectionist measures a commodified rather than a discourse
conception of culture, improperly portraying these foreign advocates
as elitist rather than democratic. In conclusion, Part III suggests that,
in this area, principle calls not for strict free trade, but rather for
limited forms of protectionism and for support of a different body of
principles-those of international human rights law-to address
concerns about censorship. In contrast, continued American
insistence on strict free trade rules in the area of cultural products
would make the United States into an international bully, not the
world leader in the realm of rights of expression.
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